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A NATURAL PROGRESSION OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY: 
WHY THE JASTA AMENDMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Eric T. Kohan* 
Abstract: On September 11, 2001, terrorists from extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four 
commercial flights and flew two into the World Trade Center towers in New York City and 
one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Many sought justice for friends and loved ones 
harmed in the attacks by bringing lawsuits against Saudi Arabia. These lawsuits alleged that 
Saudi Arabian leaders knowingly donated to charities that funded al-Qaeda which helped the 
group to pay for the September 11th terror attacks. The Second Circuit, however, dismissed 
the lawsuit on sovereign immunity grounds in 2008. Frustrated with the ruling, Congress 
passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). JASTA amended the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act to allow lawsuits against foreign states when the plaintiffs allege 
the foreign state intentionally funded, sponsored, or facilitated intentional acts of terrorism on 
United States soil. This amendment has received global criticism for both its practical and legal 
effect on the rest of the world. The harshest critics claim that the United States is now in 
violation of international law, bolstered by a recent decision from the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. This Comment argues that the JASTA 
amendment to sovereign immunity does not violate international law or the ICJ decision. Due 
to the development of state immunity and the particular protections provided to sovereign acts 
in the ICJ decision, the JASTA amendment only denies state immunity when the foreign state 
is acting as a private citizen. Therefore, the JASTA amendment does not violate international 
law. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the al-Qaeda terror group 
hijacked four commercial airplanes. They flew them into the World Trade 
Center’s Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, 
D.C.1 The attack affected millions of lives, directly and indirectly.2 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Craig H. Allen for his guidance, edits, and input. Many thanks are also extended to Professor 
Karen Boxx, who mentored all Class of 2018 Law Review students on their Comments, and Professor 
Melissa J. Durkee, who helped develop my initial argument. I would also like to thank the wonderful 
team at Washington Law Review, without which this piece would not be possible.  
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 32–
33 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
2. Brad Plumer, Nine Facts About Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11, WASH. POST (Sept. 
11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-
in-the-united-states-since-911/ [https://perma.cc/H7CL-PC9H]; Shan Carter & Amanda Cox, One 
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Following the attack, those more directly affected asked a familiar 
question: who is to blame? In response, many people attempted to blame 
Saudi Arabia—the country of origin for fifteen of the nineteen plane 
hijackers—and tried to hold the country accountable in America’s courts.3 
The victims soon learned they would not see their day in court. The 
plaintiffs alleged Saudi Arabia purposely funded charities that it knew 
would transfer the funds to Muslim extremists, including the terror group 
al-Qaeda, and therefore it knowingly funded intentional acts of terrorism.4 
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the consolidated 
suit on the pleadings, holding that Saudi Arabia was entitled to foreign 
sovereign immunity.5 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.6 
Unsettled by the Second Circuit’s ruling, Congress worked to amend 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)7 to ensure 9/11 victims 
could at least take their claims past pleadings. With the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA),8 Congress sought to allow plaintiffs 
to sue foreign states in United States courts for sponsoring intentional acts 
of terrorism, such as the terrorist attacks on 9/11.9 In 2009,10 2011,11 
2013,12 and 2015,13 members of Congress introduced different versions of 
JASTA, but none of the bills passed Congress. 
In 2016, the bill finally found the congressional support it needed to 
become law. It passed the House in May 2016 and the Senate in 
September 2016.14 President Obama, however, vetoed the law, citing 
concerns with taking foreign policy out of the hands of the executive 
                                                     
9/11 Tally: $3.3 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive 
/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html [https://perma.cc/Y5RN-4Q4P]. 
3. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Terrorist Attacks III), 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); see also THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 215–54. 
4. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d at 77. 
5. Id. at 97. 
6. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 557 U.S. 935 (2009) (denying certiorari). 
7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012). 
8. Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1605B, 2333 (2016)). 
9. Id. 
10. S. 2930, 111th Cong. (2009). 
11. S. 1894, 112th Cong. (2011). 
12. S. 1535, 113th Cong. (2013). 
13. S. 2040, 114th Cong. (2015). 
14. Actions Overview, S. 2040, 114th Congress, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
114th-congress/senate-bill/2040/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22justice+ 
against+sponsors+of+terrorism%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=1 [https://perma.cc/W63N-RGFH] 
[hereinafter Actions Overview]. 
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branch and putting it in the hands of the people and the judiciary.15 Soon 
after, and for the first time in President Obama’s presidency, Congress 
overrode the President’s veto.16 On September 28, 2016, JASTA became 
law.17 The JASTA amendment has retroactive effect, allowing victims of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks to sue foreign states using the JASTA 
amendment.18 
Leading up to and following its passage in Congress, JASTA received 
large amounts of criticism for both practical and legal reasons.19 Focusing 
on the legal reasons, many scholars and state leaders believe that this 
amendment runs afoul of customary international law principles of state 
immunity.20 JASTA specifically revokes state immunity for states alleged 
to have committed international acts of terrorism—an unprecedented 
prospect in international law.21 The lack of support for this type of 
exception to state immunity shows that it may lack the state practice and 
opinio juris22 required to give it the status of customary international 
law.23 Many scholars have argued that acts such as terrorism, if 
attributable to a state, are not deserving of state immunity because such 
acts violate jus cogens norms: those norms from which no derogation by 
                                                     
15. Barack Obama, Veto Message from the President—S. 2040, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23, 
2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-
s2040 [https://perma.cc/L8T6-DWFL]. 
16. Actions Overview, supra note 14. 
17. Id. 
18. JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1605B, 
2333 (2016)).  
19. See, e.g., Fatah Al-Rahman Youssef, Former French Justice Minister: JASTA Is a Violation 
to International Law, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Oct. 5, 2016), http://english.aawsat.com/2016/10/article 
55359628/former-french-justice-minister-jasta-violation-international-law [https://perma.cc/VQ4Q-
XYZY]. 
20. Id. (“I believe that JASTA represents a violation to international law, as it threatens the 
principle of national sovereign immunity.”). 
21. Cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. 99, 140 (Feb. 3) (holding there is no jus cogens violations exception to state immunity). 
22. Opinio juris refers to actual statements from state officials, such as heads of executives, 
diplomats, ambassadors, or other public officials. See id. at 123. 
23. Cf. id. at 141–42 (examining state practice and opinio juris to determine whether a jus cogens-
violations exception to state immunity exists). 
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a state is permitted.24 Domestic, foreign, and international courts have 
consistently rejected this argument.25 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently reviewed the 
intersection of state immunity and jus cogens violations in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State.26 The case concerned Italian courts denying state 
immunity to Germany for suits against it relating to certain inhumane 
actions it took during World War II.27 The Italian courts reasoned that 
Germany did not deserve sovereign immunity protection because of the 
abysmal character of its actions in enslaving Italian citizens after the 
nation fell to the Allied powers towards the end of World War II.28 In 
holding the Italian courts violated international law on sovereign 
immunity, the ICJ held that there is no reason to conflate sovereign 
immunity and potential jus cogens violations because sovereign immunity 
was procedural, whereas jus cogens was substantive, meaning the two 
concepts should never collide.29 Essentially, the immunity of a state and 
its specific actions in question should never influence the treatment of one 
another in a court of law.30 Additionally, the ICJ noted the important 
distinction in state immunity cases between official state acts and acts in 
which the state functions more as a private entity.31 Official state acts, 
known as acta de jure imperii, are those that only a state may perform, 
such as military actions.32 Private state acts, known as acta de jure 
gestionis, are acts performed by the state that any person or entity could 
perform.33 For example, any state can choose to trade or bargain for goods 
and services with merchants like any private party can, so a state is not 
                                                     
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(explaining the definition of peremptory norms, known as jus cogens norms); see also, e.g., Thora A. 
Johnson, A Violation of Jus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity Under the Federal 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. 259 (1995) (arguing for a jus cogens waiver of foreign 
sovereign immunity). 
25. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 141–42. 
26. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99, 140 (Feb. 3).  
27. Id. at 113. 
28. Id. at 113–14. 
29. Id. at 124. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 124–25. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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generally afforded immunity in disputes arising from these state actions 
of private character.34 
Contrary to the overwhelming majority, this Comment argues that the 
JASTA amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not 
actually put the United States in conflict with international law.35 The 
JASTA amendment is distinguishable from Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State because, unlike Germany’s actions during the Third Reich, the 
acts committed by potential JASTA defendants are not likely acta de jure 
imperii. This is because the hypothetical JASTA case is not one in which 
a state official orders a state military to act a certain way in a time of war. 
Even if state acts of intentional terrorism are acta de jure imperii, they 
should not be seen as sovereign acts due to their abhorrent character. 
Additionally, jus cogens violations should supersede state immunity. 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State was incorrect to say jus cogens 
norms and state immunity exist in separate legal planes, unable to affect 
one another, due to the history of court decisions denying state immunity 
based on the substantive merits of the case. Lastly, if all else fails, United 
States courts will endeavor to interpret the JASTA amendment in a way 
that does not violate international law, as there is a presumption that 
Congress does not intend to violate international law. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I examines how sovereign 
immunity developed by looking at the state’s actions to determine whether 
or not it deserved state immunity. Part II examines the concept of jus 
cogens norms, and how they came to supersede over every other aspect of 
international law. Part III examines the intersection of jus cogens norms 
and state immunity, including an overview of the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) articles on states’ immunity and attribution. Part III 
will also examine the ICJ’s views on state immunity, including a 
discussion of its findings in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, its most 
recent robust discussion of state immunity. Part IV traces the creation and 
passage of JASTA, including the terror attacks of September 11, the 
ensuing litigation, the override of President Obama’s veto, and the 
criticisms JASTA has received. Lastly, Part V argues that the JASTA 
amendment to the FSIA does not violate international law. 
                                                     
34. Id. 
35. This Comment does not discuss the practical arguments against the JASTA amendment to the 
FSIA, including whether or not this amendment strains our relationships with other countries. There 
are many strong practical arguments against this law. Those arguments are best made to Senators and 
Representatives.  
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I. STATE IMMUNITY: DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT 
PRACTICE 
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, governments of foreign 
states are immune from suits in the domestic courts of another nation.36 It 
generally applies not only to actions directly against states, but also any 
actions that affect the property, rights, interests, or activities of a foreign 
state.37 State immunity grew from the concept of par in parem no habet 
imperium: between equals no power.38 It evolved from an idea that all 
states are equal with each other.39 Under the doctrine, one state cannot 
force another state to answer to the jurisdiction of the first nation’s 
domestic courts.40 Sovereign immunity is a part of customary 
international law, meaning it finds its roots in state practice (the actions 
of states and their courts), and opinio juris (the belief of states and its 
actors that they are bound by the concept).41 A nation’s failure to give 
state immunity where it is due is a violation of international law.42 Beyond 
customary international law, state immunity can also exist by a treaty 
between two or more states.43 Properly invoking state immunity means a 
state is completely immune from suit, and need not even enter the 
litigation process.44 
This Part examines state immunity in several stages. First, it traces the 
roots of state immunity from classic philosophers and jurists, and the 
belief that the sovereign could literally do no wrong. Second, it discusses 
                                                     
36. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N. Doc. 
A/46/10, at 22–23 (1991).  
37. Id. at 24. 
38. Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in 
Contemporary Jurisprudence, 46 GEO J. INT’L L. 1151, 1152 (2015). 
39.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 123. 
40. Id. at 123–24. 
41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 
(“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 122 (holding, pursuant to ICJ 
Statute art. 38(1)(b), “the existence of a rule of customary international law requires that there be ‘a 
settled practice’ together with opinio juris”). 
42. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 123–24. 
43. See, e.g., European Convention on State Immunity, opened for signature May 16, 1972, 1495 
U.N.T.S. 181 (entered into force June 11, 1976); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, U.N. Doc. A/Res/59/508 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
(opened for signature Jan. 17, 2005 and not yet entered into force). 
44. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 1 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) 
(stating foreign states are “immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States” subject to 
exceptions). 
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various nations’ acceptance of “absolute” state immunity, in which states 
were very likely to receive immunity in foreign domestic courts, no matter 
the circumstances. Third, it discusses the world’s gradual shift to a more 
“restrictive” form of state immunity, with which a state was sometimes 
denied immunity from suit depending on the character of the state’s 
actions. 
A. In the Beginning—Absolute Immunity 
“Absolute” state immunity refers to the era in which most states gave 
other states immunity a substantial portion of the time, even if litigants 
claimed that the state did something unlawful. State immunity grew from 
the intersection of two separate (but related) doctrines: domestic 
sovereign immunity and equality between states.45 With that in mind, this 
section will first focus on the development of both concepts into the 
recognition of a “state immunity” doctrine. It will then focus on how the 
concept of state immunity developed from the common law before the 
United States and eventually became accepted within the United States. 
1. Early Sovereign Immunity Reflected the Understanding that 
Sovereigns Could Do No Wrong 
State immunity partially grew from the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, which protects the government of a state from suit in its own 
domestic courts.46 Sovereign immunity developed from the idea that 
“[t]he king can do no wrong” in the feudal system.47 People did not view 
the king as “above the law,” so to speak, but as simply protected from 
answering in the courts of his own area of governance.48 Because nation-
states did not exist in the era of the feudal system, immunity was personal 
to the king himself, rather than belonging to the nation-state.49 
Even though the doctrine started as a practical matter,50 it developed 
into a more extreme, “God-given” understanding around the rise of the 
                                                     
45. See P. H. KOOIJMANS, THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES (1964); George 
W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476, 477–79 
(1953). 
46. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996). 
47. Pugh, supra note 45, at 476. 
48. Id. at 478. 
49. Id. 
50. In this context, “practical” means it simply would be impractical to ask the king to answer to 
himself in his own court of his own land over which he governed. See id. 
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nation-state.51 In his writings, Blackstone noted the infallibility of the 
king: 
Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the 
king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection . . . . The king, 
moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of 
thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in 
him is no folly or weakness . . . the law will not suppose the king 
to have meant either an unwise or an injurious action.52 
So while sovereign immunity grew from the practicality of the 
situation, that being the king as the representative of the law and therefore 
unanswerable to it, it eventually evolved into a trait of the king’s “personal 
perfection.”53 It extended so far in some states as to assume that the king 
could not even authorize an unlawful act.54 In other words, the king’s 
orders authorizing an unlawful act would be assumed non-existent, and 
the private citizen could not use the king’s orders as a defense.55 While 
developing in disparate cases throughout Europe, this marked the 
beginning of the era of “absolute immunity,” in which states were 
afforded total immunity from all, or nearly all, claims or actions against 
the government.56 
While the above explains how domestic sovereign immunity 
developed, equality in the law between states finds its roots as far back as 
Greek philosophers. Aristotle commented on the idea of a perfect 
community, in which several systems can coexist peacefully, with each 
part providing its purpose to the community and benefiting from the other 
parts of the community providing their own purposes.57 Later 
philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, carried the torch lit by Aristotle. 
Hobbes reasoned that all people are absolutely equal in the state of 
nature.58 He further noted that people transfer their rights to the state as a 
part of their agreement with the sovereign to protect the people from the 
dangers existing in nature, meaning that the sovereign is the 
                                                     
51. Id.  
52. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 238–39 (Neill H. 
Alford et al. eds., 1983) (1765). 
53. Id. 
54. Pugh, supra note 45, at 479–80. 
55. Id. 
56. Matthew McMenamin, State Immunity Before the International Court of Justice: 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), 44 VICTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 189, 191 (2013). 
57. 1 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (J. L. Ackrill & Lindsay Judson, eds., Trevor J. Saunders, trans., 
Clarendon Press 1995) (n.d.). 
58. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 94 (W. G. Pogson Smith, ed., Clarendon Press 1909) (1651). 
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personification of the whole.59 Therefore, the right of equality between 
people transferred to the sovereigns of states via the social contract, and 
because all people were equal, all states, too, were equal.60 It is from these 
ideas of human and state equality that state immunity grew. 
Following the work done by Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, a seventeenth-
century German jurist and philosopher, expanded the idea of equality of 
the laws directly to international law.61 Pufendorf was not an advocate of 
international law as a binding concept, outside the idea of treaties.62 He 
reasoned that no law between nations can be truly binding outside of the 
concept of pacta sunt servanda—agreements are to be kept.63 This 
disbelief in the enforceability of international law naturally extended to 
state immunity and equality.64 He reasoned that states could not enforce 
international law against each other because no one state is superior to the 
other, and without such superiority there can be no true law of nations.65 
Absent a higher authority to enforce these concepts of international 
norms—found through natural law—states were implicitly equal to each 
other in terms of the law.66 Therefore, through the absence of a binding 
and applicable system of international law, Pufendorf was one of the first 
to explicitly recognize equality of states in application of the law, as any 
attempt of enforcement upon another state conflicts with the concepts of 
state equality found in the law of nature.67 
2. The Acceptance of Absolute State Immunity in the United States 
The first case to recognize absolute state immunity in the United States 
was The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.68 In that case, the Supreme 
Court granted immunity to France in an action by United States citizens 
John McFaddon and William Greetham to recover their schooner, 
                                                     
59. See id. at 128–42. 
60. See id. at 94–99.  
61. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 330 (James Brown 
Scott, ed., C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather, trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (photo. reprint 1964) 
(1688).  
62. Id. at 380, 402. 






68. 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
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Exchange, after the French army allegedly stole the ship from them.69 As 
alleged by the petitioners, the two left the city of Baltimore in October of 
1809, bound for St. Sebastians in Spain.70 As the petitioners were 
peacefully traveling, the two alleged that French forces, under the orders 
of Emperor Napoleon, forcibly took the schooner into their own 
possession and “disposed” of both McFaddon and Greetham.71 After the 
two found their way back to the United States, they heard of a schooner, 
similar to the description of the one taken from them, in the port of 
Philadelphia in late 1811.72 McFaddon and Greetham alleged that their 
schooner had been made a warship in the royal French army, and was 
renamed to the Balaou.73 They filed for the vessel to be returned to their 
possession.74 The District Court of Maryland dismissed the action, stating 
that the foreign armed vessel “is not subject to the ordinary judicial 
tribunals of the country.”75 On appeal, the decision was reversed.76 On 
behalf of the French monarchy, a United States district attorney appealed 
to the Supreme Court.77 
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Marshall framed the 
question presented as follows: “whether an American citizen can assert, 
in an American court, a title to an armed national vessel, found within the 
waters of the United States.”78 The Court ruled in favor of France and 
reinstated the district court’s opinion.79 The Court acknowledged the 
absolute nature of state immunity, reasoning that it flows from the idea of 
domestic sovereign immunity.80 It noted that a sovereign’s control over 
the jurisdictional bounds of the courts in its own country is “exclusive and 
absolute,” meaning that the only limitation on this control could come 
from the sovereign itself.81 However, because the world is “composed of 
distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence,” 
all states have agreed to a “relaxation” in the practice of total sovereign 
                                                     
69. Id. at 147. 
70. Id. at 117. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 118. 
74. Id. at 117. 
75. Id. at 119–20. 
76. Id. at 120. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 135. 
79. Id. at 147.  
80. Id. at 136; see also supra section I.A.1. 
81. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136. 
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judicial control, and offer immunity to foreign states in their respective 
jurisdictions.82 Chief Justice Marshall expressed concern about what 
would happen if a state exercised its territorial powers “in a manner not 
consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world,” 
referring to the possible assertion of jurisdiction over foreign entities on a 
nation-state’s own soil.83 
The Court recognized that there might be some limitations to the 
application of state immunity, albeit in very limited circumstances.84 By 
implication, state immunity only applied to the people and governments 
of states with whom the United States is friendly, and therefore not at 
war.85 Along with that, states could usually assume that the touching down 
of an army on the shores of a friendly power, without permission, could 
be seen as an act of hostility, thus doing away with state immunity once 
again.86 However, the Court held that it was common practice for states to 
allow foreign ships to seek refuge in ports in cases of severe weather or 
other emergencies.87 While this practice was normally done via treaty, and 
no relevant treaty between the United States and France was applicable to 
this situation, the Court ruled that ports remain open for foreign ships 
regardless, and thus “the conclusion seems irresistible, that they enter by 
[the state’s] assent.”88 The Court then held that “by the unanimous consent 
of nations . . . nations have not yet asserted their jurisdiction over the 
public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering a port open for their 
reception.”89 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court held that the 
schooner, as a warship of a friendly power and in an open port, was 
afforded immunity from any sort of action, including a claim to title by 
McFaddon.90 McFaddon countered that sovereign status and the ship’s 
place in the royal army of France did not bar an action for the title of the 
                                                     
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 137. 
84. Id. at 140. 
85. Id. (“Without doubt, a military force can never gain immunities of any other description that 
those which war gives, by entering a foreign territory against the will of its sovereign.”). 
86. Id. at 140–41. 
87. Id. (“But the rule which is applicable to armies, does not appear to be equally applicable to 
ships of war entering the ports of a friendly power.”). 
88. Id. at 141. 
89. Id. at 144; see also The “ARA Libertad” Case (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012, 2012 ITLOS Rep. 332, 341 (“[U]nder customary international law, as it is recognized and 
enshrined in the Convention, the immunity of warships is a special and autonomous type of immunity 
which provides for the complete immunity of these ships.”).  
90. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 147. 
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ship, and that state immunity afforded no such protection from this type 
of action.91 However, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the opinion relied 
on the “general rule” of state immunity, which could only be undone by 
some sort of national act.92 Without such an act existing, the Court ruled 
in favor of the French ship and barred McFaddon and Greetham from 
asserting their claim to the schooner in question.93 
While the Court granted immunity to the French warship in The 
Schooner Exchange, it was unclear how far state immunity extended. For 
instance, would the Court have decided the case differently had the ship 
been a foreign, government-owned merchant ship?94 The Supreme Court 
answered that question over one hundred years later in Berizzi Bros. Co. 
v. The Pesaro.95 A merchant ship, owned by the Italian government, 
allegedly failed to deliver silk cargo from Italy to New York.96 Relying on 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, the Court 
extended immunity to the Italian-owned merchant ships, figuring the 
omission of merchant ships from discussion in The Schooner Exchange 
“is not of special significance” because, in 1812, governments were not 
known to employ merchant ships.97 So while the petitioners brought the 
libel in rem claim under section 24, cl. 3 of the Judicial Code, which gave 
district courts the power to hear “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction,” the Court held that it implicitly excludes jurisdiction over in 
rem actions against the ships of a friendly foreign government.98 With The 
Pesaro, the Court made clear that it was willing to extend foreign 
sovereign immunity to foreign governments in almost any type of state 
action.99 
Soon after The Pesaro, however, the Court signaled that it might be 
moving towards a new era of state immunity, in which the State 
                                                     
91. Id. at 146. 
92. Id. at 147. 
93. Id.  
94. XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (James Crawford & John S. 
Bell eds., 2012) (“In this sense, The Schooner Exchange has been rightly perceived as ambiguous, 
since one would wonder what Justice Marshall might have decided if the ship had been a merchant 
vessel.”). 
95. 271 U.S. 562 (1926). 
96. Id. at 569–70. 
97. Id. at 573. For more on the current treatment of warships and other non-commercial vessels, 
as was the subject of The Schooner Exchange, see the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 32, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, 409 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
98. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 576. 
99. Id. 
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Department played a crucial role. In The Navemar v. The Navemar,100 the 
Spanish government claimed title to a ship presently held in New York, 
in which several parties claimed ownership.101 However, the ambassador 
of Spain could not show with sufficient proof that the ship belonged to the 
Spanish government.102 After a full hearing to determine the rightful 
owner of the ship, the district court determined that the ship was never in 
Spanish possession, and thus the Spanish government was not entitled to 
a dismissal for sovereign immunity.103 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed, stating that the district court should have taken the claim to title 
by the Spanish government as conclusive and dismissed the action in 
accordance with state immunity jurisprudence.104 The Supreme Court 
reversed.105 Writing for the Court, Justice Stone found the fact that the 
State Department refused to act on the Spanish government’s claim to title 
compelling.106 The Court used this fact to resolve the question of law—
whether or not the claim to The Navemar was barred by state immunity—
in favor of petitioners.107 The Navemar signaled a movement towards 
relying on the actions and opinions of the State Department in deciding 
questions of state immunity.108 
B. From Absolute to Restrictive: Recognizing Exceptions to State 
Immunity 
Restrictive state immunity symbolizes a pullback from absolute state 
immunity and refers to a form of jurisprudence recognizing multiple 
exceptions to the normal rule of state immunity. As was suggested in The 
Pesaro, the jurists near the origin of the state immunity doctrine in modern 
law could not have foreseen a situation in which state governments were 
trading with private parties via merchant vessels.109 As the years went on, 
governments became more and more involved in commercial 
transactions, such as the transactions that preceded the legal actions in The 
                                                     
100. 303 U.S. 68 (1938). 
101. Id. at 70. 
102. Id. at 70–71. 
103. Id. at 73. 
104. Id. at 73–74. 
105. Id. at 75. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See JAMES COOPER-HILL ET AL., THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TERRORISM 61 
(2006). 
109. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573 (1926). 
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Pesaro.110 Because commercial transactions could end in legal 
disagreements (once again, as one did in The Pesaro), some people 
became concerned that governments would abuse their jurisdictional 
immunities to avoid courtroom disputes.111 But because of the immunity 
afforded to sovereign vessels and transactions, private persons were 
inclined not to do business with sovereigns, knowing that the sovereign 
could claim state immunity and be immune to any action against it.112 
The chipping away at the absolute immunity doctrine took place over 
a long period of time.113 However, most states began making these rapid 
changes in their usage of state immunity following the conclusion of the 
Second World War.114 It was at this point that the states began to 
distinguish between acta de jure imperii, sovereign acts, and acta de jure 
gestionis, private or commercial acts.115 The doctrine of restrictive 
immunity generally granted immunity for acta de jure imperii, but not for 
a state’s acta de jure gestionis.116 
Because the change from absolute to restrictive state immunity 
happened case-by-case within each nation, each state’s advancement 
towards restriction developed differently, and with unique distinctions 
from one another.117 
1. The Development of Restrictive Immunity in the United States 
In the United States, absolute immunity was never truly “absolute” in 
the purest sense of the word because a state could not just do whatever it 
wanted and receive state immunity as a result.118 In The Schooner 
Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall hinted at the concept of an implied 
                                                     
110. McMenamin, supra note 56, at 191. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Yang, supra note 94, at 11. By “chipping away,” I am referring to the process over a long 
period of time in which legislatures and courts found several exceptions to state immunity. As Yang 
notes, “[t]o say that the history of State immunity is one of movement from absolute to restrictive 
immunity does not mean that there is a sharply defined point of time at which international practice 
as a whole made such a shift. For there is no such point . . . .” Id.  
114. Id.  
115. Id.; see also McMenamin, supra note 56, at 191–92. 
116. McMenamin, supra note 56, at 191–92. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court of the 
United States expressly rejected the argument that a state’s immunity rests on whether or not it was 
engaging in private or public acts. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). 
117. SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 162–256 (1960) (detailing the change from absolute to restrictive immunity by several different 
nations). 
118. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 140 (1812). 
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waiver of the protections granted by state immunity.119 Additionally, as 
far as the cases in actions involving vessels owned by foreign 
governments (which provided the bulk of state immunity jurisprudence in 
the early days of the doctrine), states were only afforded immunity in 
actions disputing the ownership or liens on vessels or their cargo if those 
vessels were dedicated to public service.120 In this regard, “public service” 
means that the vessel is used for official state acts, or acts that only a state 
could perform due to its capacity as a sovereign.121 For example, a state 
could employ an official warship for commission in its armed forces, but 
a private party could do no such thing.122 However, the “public service” 
test was generally conditioned on a state’s ability to prove that it possessed 
the ship at the time in which the dispute arose.123 This meant that a key 
question in several immunity cases involving public merchant vessels was 
whether or not the state had actual possession of the merchant vessel 
during the events in question or the commencement of any action 
involving the merchant vessel.124 Actual possession by a sovereign then 
became a quintessential question in state immunity cases.125 Even in the 
era of absolute immunity, United States courts were unwilling to take 
foreign governments for their word that ships or vessels actually belonged 
to the state; the foreign governments had to prove that in court.126 
a. The Court Begins Deferring to the Executive Branch 
As the United States shifted into a more restrictive era of state 
immunity, it started deferring to the executive branch instead of deciding 
the matter on its own right.127 The beginning of this deference doctrine 
could be traced, at least in part, to the Court’s recognition of the “plenary 
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”128 Just two years 
                                                     
119. Id. (“Without doubt, a military force can never gain immunities of any other description than 
those which war gives, by entering a foreign territory against the will of its sovereign.”). 
120. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 183. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 184–85. 
124. Id.; see also The Navemar v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 73 (1938) (holding that Spain was 
not entitled to state immunity on an in rem action over its purported vessel because it could not prove 
it possessed the ship). 
125. See, e.g., The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 73. 
126. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 184–85. 
127. See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
128. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
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following the well-known United States v. Curtiss-Wright129 decision, 
which recognized the President’s inherent authority over foreign 
affairs,130 Justice Stone noted in The Navemar that the lack of State 
Department action on Spain’s claim to title over the ship helped resolve 
the issue of actual possession, and thus state immunity.131 Five years 
following The Navemar, the Court furthered its deference to opinions of 
the State Department in Ex parte Republic of Peru.132 In a dispute over a 
steamship in Louisiana, Peru intervened to claim ownership of the ship.133 
Claiming immunity on behalf of the vessel, Peru sought to have the case 
dismissed.134 In support of its claim to immunity, Peru “follow[ed] the 
accepted course of procedure” by receiving recognition of the immunity 
claim from the State Department.135 Nonetheless, the district court denied 
the claim for immunity, and Peru petitioned for a writ of mandamus 
against the district court.136 The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding 
“[u]pon recognition and allowance of the claim by the State Department 
and certification of its action presented to the court by the Attorney 
General, it is the court’s duty to surrender the vessel.”137 These cases 
signaled the beginning of an era in which the State Department played a 
key role in questions of state immunity. 
Within this era of State Department deference, situated approximately 
between the 1920s to the mid-1950s, there were three ways in which the 
executive might influence judicial decisions of state immunity.138 First, 
the executive could recognize a claim of immunity by itself.139 In United 
States of Mexico v. Schmuck,140 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that, 
upon receiving a certification of immunity from the State Department, the 
question of immunity “ceased to be a judicial question,” and was instead 
treated as an executive decision.141 Whether or not an inquiry would have 
resolved the question of immunity differently is immaterial; what matters 
                                                     
129. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
130. Id. at 329. 
131. The Navemar v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75 (1938).  
132. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
133. Id. at 580. 
134. Id. at 581. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 579. 
137. Id. at 588. 
138. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 191–92. 
139. Id. 
140. 56 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1944). 
141. Id. at 580. 
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is that the State Department came to an official conclusion regarding the 
issuance of immunity, and the judiciary must honor that recognition.142 
The second method of executive intervention was the courts accepting 
that a foreign government’s statements were true, while passing on the 
final question of immunity because the executive answered that 
question.143 In this method, a court accepted the executive’s stipulated 
facts as binding and unquestionable.144 In United States v. Pink,145 the 
Court deferred to a presidential decree that the USSR existed as a 
sovereign nation, and thus USSR law applied to a dispute over the vesting 
of a piece of property.146 While the executive did not afford any country 
state immunity, the President’s decree that the USSR existed as a 
recognized nation changed the course of the entire case. The Court made 
no attempt to question this executive declaration, as it feared it would 
“usurp the executive function if we held that that decision was not final 
and conclusive in the courts.”147 Thus, even in cases where immunity was 
not at issue, the executive could still stipulate to certain facts on 
international matters that might affect the outcome of the case, and which 
the judiciary could not fight against. 
Lastly, the executive may make suggestions to the courts regarding 
international matters, including state immunity.148 While a suggestion 
may sound similar to the first level of State Department involvement, 
explained above, the differences lie in whether or not the State 
Department offered a certification of immunity, as opposed to a mere 
suggestion of state immunity.149 Essentially, this means the court would 
have discretion to make the final decision on immunity, knowing where 
the executive stood and weighing the executive recommendation.150 As 
happened in cases such as The Navemar and Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffman,151 the Court rejected the State Department’s suggestion of 
                                                     
142. Id. at 580–81. 
143. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 191. 
144. Id. 
145. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
146. Id. at 234. 
147. Id. at 230. 
148. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 192. 
149. Compare United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 56 N.E.2d 577, 581 (N.Y. 1944) (holding 
Mexico immune in U.S. courts after the State Department issued a certification of immunity), with 
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 37–38 (1945) (holding Mexico not immune in action, 
even though the State Department suggested offering state immunity). 
150. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 192. 
151. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
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immunity, both times because of a failure on behalf of the foreign nation 
to show actual possession of the vessel in question.152 
b. The Tate Letter Era—The State Department’s Control over 
Granting State Immunity 
While the doctrine of restrictive state immunity first grew from 
disputes over ship ownership, the State Department clarified with the Tate 
Letter that the executive should apply such a restrictive doctrine to all 
commercial transactions.153 
The executive’s involvement with the judiciary in the area of state 
immunity became more solidified in 1952 after it directly endorsed the 
restrictive model of state immunity.154 Jack Tate, then-acting legal adviser 
to the Department of State, issued a letter to the acting Attorney General, 
actively endorsing the restrictive theory of state immunity.155 It addressed 
the two competing theories of state immunity—absolute and restrictive—
with Mr. Tate eventually discussing and explaining the benefits of the 
restrictive immunity doctrine.156 He concluded: 
Finally the Department feels that the widespread and increasing 
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial 
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons 
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the 
courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s 
policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 
the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant 
of sovereign immunity.157 
The Tate letter drastically changed the process through which foreign 
states would litigate state immunity claims in the United States. While the 
State Department was tangentially involved in the early development of 
the restrictive doctrine, it now became directly involved, because foreign 
sovereigns could petition for the State Department’s permission for 
                                                     
152. Id. at 37–38; The Navemar v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75 (1938). 




157. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changing Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign 
Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 (1952).  
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immunity before ever litigating the matter in court.158 The “suggestion” of 
immunity by the State Department became much more important.159 
The Supreme Court officially endorsed a deferential attitude to the 
State Department’s recommendations in the post-Tate Letter era in 
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China,160 holding “[t]he 
status of the Republic of China in our courts is a matter for determination 
by the executive and is outside the competence of this Court.”161 It noted 
the recent developments in the State Department’s involvement in the 
granting or waiving of immunity, stating “the State Department is the 
normal means of suggesting to the courts that a sovereign be granted 
immunity from a particular suit.”162 
Following National City Bank, courts stopped interpreting State 
Department findings as mere “suggestions,” but rather as findings with 
which the courts declined to take a different position.163 In Amkor Corp. 
v. The Bank of Korea,164 a New York district court held that the immunity 
recommendation from the Department of the State “is binding on this 
Court.”165 The Amkor Corp. court relied on Victory Transport Inc. v. 
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos Transportes,166 in which the 
Second Circuit held “the courts have quite naturally deferred to the policy 
pronouncements of the State Department” when it comes to decisions on 
immunity.167 A District of Columbia district court in Renchard v. 
Humphreys & Harding, Inc.168 endorsed this process, holding that “a 
suggestion of immunity is conclusive and binding on the courts.”169 Some 
courts were critical of the deference to the executive without clearly set 
standards by which the executive might abide, but nonetheless concluded 
that the executive’s conclusion should be given a large amount of 
deference.170 
                                                     
158. GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY 53 (1984). 
159. Id. 
160. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). 
161. Id. at 358. 
162. Id. at 360 (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943)). 
163. See, e.g., Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
164. 298 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
165. Id. at 144. 
166. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). 
167. Id. at 358. 
168. 381 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974). 
169. Id. at 383. 
170. See, e.g., Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 
F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Gov’t of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 
(E.D. La. 1967). 
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Soon, however, it became apparent that deference to the executive 
branch was simply not sustainable. In the late 1960s, the State Department 
started holding informal hearings on immunity claims, involving counsel 
for both parties in lawsuits and written memos and oral presentations to 
the Office of the Legal Adviser.171 Essentially, the State Department was 
conducting quasi-judicial hearings to decide the question of immunity, 
which, outside the foreign or international relations area, was a task 
usually reserved for the judiciary.172 Additionally, foreign states did not 
always petition for immunity from the State Department, meaning the 
courts had to rely on old State Department determinations to come to their 
conclusions.173 This led to a situation in which two branches of 
government, sometimes cooperating, sometimes not, were making 
decisions on state immunity with unclear policy factors.174 Seeing this, 
Congress decided that it was time to act. 
c. Codification—The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA to embrace the restrictive doctrine 
of state immunity and move immunity-granting powers from the 
executive to the judiciary.175 Finding that “American citizens are 
increasingly coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by 
foreign states,” Congress wanted United States citizens to be able to 
resolve disputes with foreign governments in domestic courts.176 It 
highlighted several situations in which a United States citizen might be 
denied appropriate relief due to state immunity, including international 
commercial relations, real estate, or even tort actions against foreign 
officials in the United States.177 
Accordingly, Congress sought to accomplish four objectives with the 
FSIA.178 First, it codified the restrictive theory of state immunity, which 
differentiated between public acts (acta de jure imperii) and private acts 
                                                     
171. BADR, supra note 158, at 54. 
172. Id. 
173. JAMES COOPER-HILL, supra note 108, at 70. 
174. Id. 
175. Id.; see also FOX, supra note 44, at 317. 
176. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6–7 (1976). 
177. Id. at 6–7 (in the report, the House noted examples included when “U.S. businessmen sell 
goods to a foreign state trading company, and disputes may arise concerning the purchase price. 
Another is when an American property owner agrees to sell land to a real estate investor that turns 
out to be a foreign government entity and conditions in the contract of sale may become a subject of 
contention”). 
178. Id. at 7–8. 
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(acta de jure gestionis), offering immunity for the former, but not the 
latter.179 Second, it transferred the power to grant immunity away from 
the executive branch.180 Congress favored the judiciary for making 
immunity decisions, as it would not only base immunity decisions on 
“purely legal grounds,” but also was free from diplomatic pressures the 
executive branch faced.181 Moving the decision from the executive to the 
judiciary ensured immunity was properly granted, rather than out of fear 
of any “adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness . . . to 
support that immunity.”182 Third, it provided a statutory procedure for 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign states for the first time in 
United States law.183 Fourth, the FSIA helped enforce judgments against 
foreign states.184 
The FSIA is now codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611.185 It generally 
provides immunity to foreign states in U.S. Courts, subject to certain 
exceptions.186 It defines a foreign state as “a political subdivision of a 
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”187 An 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state refers to any entity that is (1) 
a separate legal person, (2) “an organ of a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,” and 
(3) is neither a citizen of the United States nor a third country.188 It has the 
effect of establishing both subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction over foreign states.189 
Despite generally recognizing immunity,190 the FSIA contains several 
exceptions. Section 1605 requires courts to deny a foreign state immunity 
in cases where (1) the foreign state has waived immunity; (2) the action is 
based upon a commercial activity within the United States; (3) certain 
                                                     
179. Id. at 7. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 7–8. 
182. Id at 7. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Id. 
185. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012). 
186. Id. § 1604. 
187. Id. § 1603(a). 
188. Id. § 1603(b). 
189. See id. § 1608 (setting service of process standards to appropriately give notice to a foreign 
state). Service of process has the effect of giving proper notice, a quintessential facet of personal 
jurisdiction. Additionally, the act in its entirety has the effect of placing subject matter jurisdiction 
over all actions against foreign states. Id. 
190. Id. § 1604. 
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foreign expropriations are at issue; (4) real property or estates are at issue; 
(5) the state has allegedly committed a non-commercial tort in the United 
States (known as the territorial-tort exception); (6) the court is being asked 
to enforce an arbitration agreement; or (7) the court is deciding a maritime 
in rem action.191 In 1996, Congress added an additional exception, known 
as the “terrorism” exception, allowing suits against foreign states that 
have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism.192 The State 
Department has the sole authority to designate states as sponsors of 
terrorism.193 
Since the FSIA entered into force in 1977, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that it is the sole and exclusive jurisdictional basis for suits against foreign 
governments, agencies, and instrumentalities.194 While the FSIA has a 
very broad definition of what constitutes a state,195 the Supreme Court has 
since limited FSIA’s application. For example, in Samantar v. Yousuf,196 
the Court ruled that individual foreign officials are not entitled to state 
immunity because the definition of foreign state in the act refers to a body 
politic, rather than individuals.197 However, the old system of common 
law, used before the enactment of the FSIA, can protect individuals or 
entities that may be entitled to state immunity, but not under the FSIA.198 
The FSIA has officially shown a commitment to the restrictive doctrine 
of state immunity by the United States. 
2. The Acceptance of Restrictive Immunity Outside the United States 
Similar to the United States, the restrictive doctrine developed near the 
beginning to mid-1900s around the world due to a growing dissatisfaction 
with the absolute doctrine.199 However, other nation-states started making 
the movement towards restrictive immunity as early as the turn of the 
twentieth century, or as late as the end of the twentieth century.200 The 
restrictive approach is now enforced in many nations, including the U.K., 
Australia, Pakistan, Canada, South Africa, Japan, Singapore, Israel, 
                                                     
191. Id. § 1605(a)–(b). 
192. Id. § 1605A. 
193. Id. 
194. COOPER-HILL, supra note 108, at 71 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp, 48 U.S. 428 (1989) and Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)). 
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(b). 
196. 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
197. Id. at 314–15. 
198. Id. 
199. FOX, supra note 44, at 221. 
200. Id. at 224–35. 
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Argentina, Malaysia, Ireland, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Italy, 
Germany, France, and Spain.201 The following are a few examples of 
restrictive doctrine in nation-states other than the United States. 
a. Restrictive Immunity in the United Kingdom 
The dissatisfaction with the absolute doctrine of state immunity in the 
United Kingdom started well before the country ever codified the 
restrictive form of immunity.202 In 1952, the Privy Council of England, 
which is the body of advisers to the Kingdom of England, denied that the 
absolute rule even existed in England.203 However, scholars recognized 
that England was moving towards a practice of restrictive immunity in the 
mid-1900s.204 The “tipping point,” if there was a single point, could be 
seen as Kajina v. Tass Agency.205 In this case, Tass Agency, a department 
of the Soviet State, received state immunity in English courts despite the 
agency being registered as a business entity under English law.206 Given 
the anti-Soviet sentiments following World War II, many people were 
displeased with the result, triggering a series of debates in the legislature 
and English courts about the applicability of the absolute doctrine of state 
immunity in a modern and interconnected world.207 
Following judiciary-led veering towards the restrictive law of state 
immunity, as well as the European Convention on State Immunity of 
1972, the English legislature passed the 1978 State Immunity Act 
(SIA).208 Similar to the FSIA, the SIA affords general immunity to foreign 
states in U.K. courts, but subjects the general grant to several exceptions, 
enumerated in sections 2–17 of the Act.209 It defines a foreign state as “(a) 
the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; (b) the 
government of that State; and (c) any department of that government.”210 
                                                     
201. McMenamin, supra note 56, at 192. 
202. FOX, supra note 44, at 211.  
203. Id.  
204. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 182. 
205. [1949] 2 All ER 274 (Eng.). 
206. FOX, supra note 44, at 212. 
207. Baccus SRL v. Servicio National de Trigo [1957] 1 QB 438, 464 (Eng.) (Singleton, L.J.) 
(endorsing a policy where states, acting as trading entities, are not entitled to state immunity); see 
also Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria [1976] 3 All ER 437 (Eng.) (differentiating 
between a state’s commercial and governmental actions, ruling that “government should be subject 
to all the rules of the market place” when states act as traders). 
208. FOX, supra note 44, at 237; see also State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33 (Eng.). 
209. State Immunity Act §§ 1–17. 
210. Id. § 14(1). 
14 - Kohan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:33 PM 
1538 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1515 
 
A notable omission is the waiver exception to sovereign immunity, in 
which a state only waives its right to sovereign immunity if it expressly 
consents to suit in the U.K.211 However, a state only consents if it either 
institutes the proceedings, or has taken a step to intervene in the 
proceedings.212 Therefore, it would seem that a state cannot implicitly 
waive state immunity in the U.K., unless it somehow manages to 
accidentally initiate or intervene in proceedings. 
b. Restrictive Immunity in France 
France’s practice of state immunity first developed through case law 
rather than legislation, but that has not stopped France’s legislative bodies 
from implementing their own form of restrictive state immunity.213 The 
restrictive doctrine in France finds its roots in a 1929 decision in which 
the courts allowed a lawsuit against the commercial representative of the 
USSR.214 Following this case, two applications of state immunity 
emerged: “immunité de juridiction” and “incompétence d’attribution.”215 
Despite being two separate theories, treated differently in some French 
courts, their application means essentially the same thing, and each theory 
usually resulted in similar rulings on state immunity.216 
Immunité de juridiction, or “immunity from jurisdiction,” refers to a 
situation in which a defendant is not acting within the capacity of his or 
her position in the State.217 This would be applicable in a situation where 
a person holding a position of state authority acts outside of his or her 
capacity as a state official, but attempts to claim state immunity 
regardless.218 Essentially, when there is a disconnect between the actor’s 
official capacity and the act in question, the actor is not afforded 
immunity.219 
Incompétence d’attribution, or “incompetence of attribution,” refers to 
the nature of the case involved, and rests on what specific actions the state 
                                                     
211. Id. § 2. 
212. Id. § 2(3). 
213. See Hazel FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 226 (2d ed. 2008). The development of state 
immunity in France through the court system is interesting, considering France operates as a civil law 
country rather than a common law country. 
214. Id. 
215. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 202. 
216. Id. at 205. 
217. Id. at 203. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
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took and whether or not those actions are entitled to state immunity.220 For 
example, in a situation where a foreign bank was contended to have failed 
to exchange old banknotes, the Cour de Cassation determined that it had 
jurisdiction over the Bank of Spain because any bank in its own right 
would be subject to French jurisdiction for the same or similar acts.221 
* * * 
As these examples in and outside of the United States show, the 
international legal community has moved towards support of the 
restrictive theory of state immunity, recognizing that there are real and 
legitimate situations in which a state should not be afforded immunity in 
courts foreign to the state. Under the theory of restrictive immunity, courts 
look at the actions taken by the states to determine if immunity is 
appropriate. Now that exceptions to state immunity are commonly 
accepted, the question is, when is it appropriate to deny a foreign 
sovereign state immunity in domestic courts? This question becomes 
relevant when analyzing the intersection between jus cogens norms and 
state immunity. 
II. JUS COGENS: RECOGNITION AND PRACTICE 
Peremptory norms, also known as jus cogens, are norms “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of [s]tates as a whole . . . from 
which no derogation is permitted.”222 Jus cogens are universally 
applicable by any state against any other state because of the international 
concern of protecting humankind from jus cogens violations.223 As stated 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states cannot “contract 
out” of jus cogens responsibilities via treaty or any other kind of 
international agreement; such a treaty is automatically void.224 Jus cogens 
are the special exception to the normal practice of only enforcing 
international law if the state has consented to that international law.225 
Commonly cited and well-recognized jus cogens include the prohibition 
                                                     
220. Id. at 204. 
221. Id. 
222. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 24, art. 53, at 344. 
223. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 
(1988). 
224. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 24, art. 53, at 344. 
225. Dr. Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order, 29 PENN. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 233, 264 (2010). 
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on the use or threat of the use of aggressive armed forces, genocide, the 
taking of hostages, and torture.226 
A. The Recognition of Jus Cogens Norms: Evolution from Custom and 
Bilateral Treaties to Codification in the Vienna Convention 
Jus cogens is a recent development in international law.227 Due to jus 
cogens norms’ nature as superseding over all other forms of international 
law, they require an international structure to have effect.228 It is 
impossible to rule out the existence of jus cogens in early European years 
(1600s–1900s), but if they did exist, they had little-to-no effect on 
international conduct.229 
While there really were no identifiable jus cogens in the early 
developments of the modern world, some scholars argued for their 
existence. As early as the late 1500s, philosophers such as Hugo Grotius 
and Emer de Vattel wrote that there existed certain pieces of natural law 
that man-made law could not overcome.230 Grotius went so far as to argue 
that not even God could change these core concepts of natural law, which, 
in his belief, included the keeping of promises and that “each should be 
given his due.”231 Vattel described his form of jus cogens as “necessary 
law,” which was simply natural law that applied to the states.232 In his 
opinion, states could not simply rid themselves of the moral 
responsibilities of necessary law via treaties or customs, and such 
practices were illegal in his eyes.233 So while there was little official 
recognition of jus cogens in history, scholars were arguing for jus cogens 
norms’ existence and recommending actions similar to those done 
between states today.234 
Through the 1800s and early 1900s, most forms of jus cogens came in 
the form of treaties or agreements between two or more nation-states. For 
instance, in 1814, the Congress of Vienna attempted to create a system of 
                                                     
226. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 223, at 356, 436. 
227. Id. at 28. 
228. Id. 
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 30. 
231. Id.; see also HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 138, 155 (Richard Turk, ed., 
Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) (ebook). 
232. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2006). 
233. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS §§ 7–9 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1863) 
(1797). 
234. Id. 
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control by the Holy Alliance over Europe.235 While the treaty did not last 
very long (there was an inability to enforce the treaty between nation-
states), it shows the early attempts of nations to create a system of 
cognizable norms that all states intended to follow.236 Many of these 
multilateral agreements dealt with the laws of war, showing that there 
indeed existed war crimes, a commonly cited jus cogens norm in the 
modern era.237 
The official codification of jus cogens came about in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, known as the “treaty on treaties.”238 
The treaty declared that any treaties attempting to violate or contract out 
of jus cogens, or peremptory norms, are void as to those clauses.239 While 
many states have their own definitions of what does and does not 
constitute jus cogens, the drafters of the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement of the Law on Foreign Relations, Third, believe that 
genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged detention, racial 
discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights are all violations of jus cogens 
norms.240 
B. Modern Jus Cogens Norms 
In modern times, what do and do not qualify as jus cogens norms 
depends on which state is making a determination on the matter. This is 
somewhat paradoxical, as the justification behind jus cogens norms is that 
the acts are so horrible that no person would attempt to justify or defend 
those acts.241 For example, a United States scholar might suggest that the 
following list qualifies as violations of jus cogens norms: piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, certain war crimes, and 
certain acts of terrorism.242 Others may argue that certain acts of terrorism 
                                                     
235. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 223, at 38. 
236. Id. at 44. 
237. Id. at 38. 
238. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 24, art. 53, at 344. 
239. Id. 
240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
241. COOPER-HILL, supra note 108, at 113 (“Some conduct is so egregious that all nations 
supposedly would support its condemnation.”). 
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (stating that the United States has “universal jurisdiction” over these acts, no 
matter where they were committed or who committed them, thereby implying that the United States 
recognizes these acts as violating jus cogens norms). 
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are not included in that list for lack of universal acceptance or 
recognition.243 
Nonetheless, it appears that whether or not the terror attacks on 
September 11, 2001, were jus cogens violations is a settled question.244 
Given the amount of devastation the hijackers caused that day,245 it seems 
appropriate to determine that the hijackers did violate some kind of jus 
cogens norms on September 11, 2001.246 
III. THE INTERSECTION OF STATE IMMUNITY AND JUS 
COGENS IN DOMESTIC, FOREIGN, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
Due to the importance of both state immunity and jus cogens norms, it 
is no wonder that these two concepts clash often in United States courts, 
foreign courts, and international courts.247 Historically, in almost every 
situation, state immunity has triumphed over jus cogens violations due to 
the lack of a distinct “jus cogens violations” exception to the rule of state 
immunity.248 Without such a clear-cut exception, states, international 
courts, and domestic courts may rely on the articles drafted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on jurisdictional immunities of 
states and their property and state responsibility.249 These articles 
represent a codified set of recognized international concepts and doctrines 
relating to state jurisdictional immunity and responsibility.250 They 
                                                     
243. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 DUKE 
L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996). 
244. See COOPER-HILL, supra note 108, at 305–06 (noting that most peremptory norms are those 
which states rely on in order to create a sustainable system of coexisting states); JAMES CRAWFORD, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 246 (2002) (finding 
that peremptory norms, including the prohibition on aggression, are those which, if not followed, 
would threaten states, their people, and basic human values). If the actions of the September 11 
terrorists can be attributed to a certain state (discussed more in section III.A, infra), then that state has 
likely violated some jus cogens norm, whether it is the prohibition on aggression, or other jus cogens 
norms concerning basic human rights and certain war crimes. See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE 
IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 227 (2008). 
245. See Carter & Cox, supra note 2. 
246. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
247. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 
2012 I.C.J. 99, 137–40 (Feb. 3). 
248. Id. 
249. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 22–23; CRAWFORD, supra note 244.   
250. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 22–23. 
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function somewhat as the familiar Restatements of the Law created by the 
American Law Institute, but on an international level, as they are used for 
reference but are not binding on states or international courts.251 
Additionally, domestic courts may receive guidance from decisions of the 
ICJ, even if those decisions are not binding on them.252 Recently, the ICJ 
held in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State that jus cogens violations do 
not allow domestic courts to proclaim jurisdiction over foreign states.253 
Accordingly, this section will proceed in three parts. First, it will assess 
how domestic courts may interpret JASTA by examining the treatment 
that the United States has afforded the intersection of jus cogens violations 
and state immunity. Second, it will show the important provisions of two 
relevant ILC articles: jurisdictional immunities of states and their 
property, and state responsibility. Lastly, it will examine cases from 
international courts, including the one most relevant to the discussion: 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, from the ICJ. 
A. State Immunity and Jus Cogens Violations in Non-International 
Courts 
Prior to the JASTA amendment, United States courts had been fairly 
clear: a jus cogens violation, in its own right, does not supersede state 
immunity because no such exception to general foreign state immunity 
exists in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).254 The path 
towards this conclusion began with Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp.,255 a case in which a Liberian shipping corporation sued 
Argentina for destroying an oil tanker under the Alien Tort Statute instead 
of the FSIA.256 On appeal by Argentina, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
action, holding that the exceptions in the FSIA are the only ways in which 
a United States court can have jurisdiction over a foreign state.257 It found 
                                                     
251. A key concept of international law is its non-binding nature, unless the state consents to be 
bound by the law or rule in question. Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1077  (stating that the decisions of the ICJ do not extend beyond the parties or 
dispute in question); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 24, art. 26, at 339 (stating 
that treaties in force are binding on the parties to them, showing the requirement of consent). 
252. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 59. 
253. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99, 137–40 (Feb. 3). 
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1605–1605A (2012); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is no jus cogens violation exception to state immunity).  
255. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
256. Id. at 431–32. 
257. Id. at 434–35. 
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that FSIA analysis must be applied in every action against a foreign state 
because the only way to have jurisdiction over a foreign state is through 
one of the exceptions in the FSIA.258 
Following Amerada Hess, the Ninth Circuit held that jus cogens 
violations do not supersede state immunity because the FSIA does not 
contain such an exception.259 In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina,260 an Argentine family brought an action against Argentina for 
the alleged torture of an Argentine citizen and an unfounded taking of 
property by the Argentine military.261 The district court dismissed the 
claims specifically related to the alleged torture because it found the 
claims did not fit into an exception under the FSIA.262 On appeal, plaintiffs 
argued that Argentina could not claim sovereign immunity when it 
violates jus cogens norms, with the jus cogens norm in this case being the 
prohibition on torture.263 While the court found that the prohibition of 
torture is certainly a jus cogens norm, a violation of a jus cogens norm is 
not an exception under the FSIA.264 Citing Amerada Hess, the court held 
the FSIA limited its ability to create exceptions to foreign sovereign 
immunity, and jus cogens violations were not an exception within the 
Act.265 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held it could not retain jurisdiction 
over Argentina for alleged jus cogens violations on its own right.266 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari without explanation.267 
Several other circuit courts have agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Siderman de Blake. In Princz v. Federal Republic of 
Germany,268 the District of Columbia Circuit held that Germany did not 
implicitly waive its sovereign immunity through jus cogens violations 
committed in the Nazi regime in the Third Reich.269 While the FSIA does 
                                                     
258. Id. (“[T]he FSIA must be applied by the district courts in every action against a sovereign, 
since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the specified 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
259. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 719. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 703–04. 
262. Id. at 713. 
263. Id. at 714. 
264. Id. at 718–19. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. However, the court did find that the actions of Argentina were enough to show an implicit 
waiver of sovereign immunity, so the claims against Argentina were not entirely defeated. Id. at 721–
22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2012)). 
267. Republic of Argentina v. Siderman de Blake, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (denying certiorari). 
268. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
269. Id. at 1174. 
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include an “implied waiver” exception to state immunity,270 that exception 
is interpreted narrowly according to the Act’s legislative history: the 
actions of the state must show a clear intent to waive whatever sovereign 
immunity it might claim in a given action.271 In Smith v. Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,272 the Second Circuit also held that jus cogens 
violations do not constitute a waiver of state immunity in an action against 
the Libyan government for its alleged involvement in the bombing of a 
Pan American Airways flight because Congress did not intend the waiver 
exception to extend that far, “however desirable such a result might be.”273 
Lastly, in Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany,274 the Seventh 
Circuit dismissed yet another attempt to bypass state immunity with jus 
cogens violations because no such exception exists in the FSIA.275 
Similar to the United States’ courts treatment of jus cogens and state 
immunity, courts outside of the United States have found that jus cogens 
violations do not abrogate state immunity. In Jones v. Saudi Arabia,276 the 
U.K. dismissed a case against Saudi Arabia over allegations of torture 
during the plaintiff’s time there in 2001.277 Throughout the opinion, the 
House of Lords searched for evidence relating to a rule of jus cogens 
violations overcoming state immunity, yet found none.278 With no such 
exception ever arising from statutory or case law in the U.K., the court 
concluded that state immunity is not superseded when plaintiffs allege jus 
cogens or human rights violations.279 Courts in Canada,280 Poland,281 
Slovenia,282 and New Zealand283 have similarly held that no such jus 
cogens foreign sovereign immunity exception exists.284 Essentially, there 
is wide agreement that jus cogens violations do not, in their own right, 
                                                     
270. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 
271. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174. 
272. 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996). 
273. Id. at 245. 
274. 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001). 
275. Id. at 1156–57. 
276. [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
277. Id. at 46–47. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 O.R. 3d 675 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
281. IV CSK 465/09 of Oct. 29, 2010 of the Supreme Court. 
282. Case No. Up-13/99, Constitutional Court of Slovenia. 
283. Fang v. Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC) (N.Z.). 
284. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99, 141–42 (Feb. 3). 
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give domestic courts the right to deny state immunity to foreign 
sovereigns. 
While several nation-states agree that state immunity is not superseded 
by jus cogens violations, many domestic courts are forced into that 
conclusion due to their own states’ laws on state immunity. For example, 
in Siderman de Blake, the Ninth Circuit, backed by the words of the 
Supreme Court in Amerada Hess, held that jus cogens violations do not 
bypass state immunity because states receive immunity via the FSIA, and 
the FSIA contains no such exception to state immunity.285 Because 
domestic rules often slightly differ from international norms, it is difficult 
to conclude that the United States’ courts’ decisions would have any effect 
on the treatment of jus cogens violations on an international level. For a 
better understanding of international law, one must study two sources: 
articles on the state of international law from the ILC, and decisions 
interpreting international law from the ICJ. 
B. Holding States Accountable—Immunity and Attribution 
Two concepts make up state accountability for actions on the 
international level: immunity and attribution. As this Comment has 
discussed in length, state immunity allows sovereign states to invoke 
immunity from jurisdiction of domestic courts in other states.286 The 
concept of state immunity on the international level is restated in length 
in the ILC’s articles on the jurisdictional immunities of states and their 
property.287 On the other hand, the concept of attribution determines 
whether or not an action can be attributed to the alleged state actor.288 
Attribution is restated in length in the articles on state responsibility.289 
1. Jus Cogens Violations and Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State and Their Property 
According to the ILC, generally, a state enjoys immunity from foreign 
domestic courts.290 However, like in the United States, the adoption of 
                                                     
285. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718–19 (9th Cir. 1992). 
286. See supra Part I. 
287. See, e.g., INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra 
note 36. 
288. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 244. 
289. Id. 
290. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
art. 5, at 22–23. 
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restrictive immunity around the world has led to numerous exceptions to 
the general rule of immunity.291 
One exception to state immunity in the ILC is that a state cannot invoke 
immunity in a case “which relates to pecuniary compensation for death or 
injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by 
an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the State.”292 This 
means that, when states injure people or damage property on foreign land, 
states cannot invoke state immunity in a domestic court of competent 
jurisdiction if the act is appropriately attributable to the state.293 According 
to commentary, two conditions are needed for this exception. First, the act 
or omission causing the injuries to the third party must occur in whole or 
in part in the territory of the state that claims jurisdiction over the 
defendant-state.294 Second, the “author” of the act or omission must be 
present in the state at the time of the act or omission to increase the 
connection between the two states.295 Application of this exception does 
not turn on whether or not the acts or omissions in question are de jure 
imperii or de jure gestionis.296 
The ILC explains that this so-called territorial-tort exception exists 
because of the concept of territoriality.297 Given that the harm occurs in a 
state’s territory, by the actor of a foreign state, causing harm to a citizen 
of the harmed state, it only makes sense to allow that state’s domestic 
courts to resolve the dispute and seek justice within the confines of that 
states’ laws.298 Accordingly, if any act in a foreign state harms a person or 
property, the state actor is present in the foreign state at the time of the 
act, and the act is attributable to the defendant-state (as found using the 
guidelines in the subsequent section), then state immunity does not apply, 
pursuant to the ILC.299 
State actions causing injury in foreign territories result in a denial of 
state immunity as long as the acts truly are attributable to the states.300 To 
                                                     
291. See, e.g., supra Part I. 
292. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
art. 12, at 44–46. 
293. Id. 




298. Id. It is important that the domestic laws would hold the defendant-state liable, and that 
international or foreign law, including the law of the defendant-state, cannot be used in the domestic 
action against the state.  
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
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determine which acts may be attributed to the state, one may turn to the 
articles on state responsibility for guidance. 
2. Attribution of Actions to States—ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility 
A state is responsible for internationally wrongful actions attributable 
to that state.301 An internationally wrongful act occurs when an act is (1) 
attributable to the state under international law and (2) constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation.302 An act is attributable to the state even if 
the actors are not official state actors if they are acting pursuant to 
instructions from the state, or under the directions and control of the 
state.303 A breach of an international obligation occurs when a state 
breaches an obligation to which it is bound at the time of the act.304 All 
states are bound by jus cogens norms at all times, even if a state does not 
agree to be bound.305 When a state is found to have committed an 
internationally wrongful act, there are certain methods through which 
states may remedy the wrongful act, including restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction.306 Notably excluded from the forms of available relief 
are suits against the state in domestic courts foreign to the acting state.307 
However, the rules of attribution and forms of remedy change if the 
state commits a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of 
international law. A serious breach occurs when the state fails to follow 
“an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law.”308 Additionally, the ILC makes clear that the appropriate 
consequences for a state that fails to follow obligations from jus cogens 
norms may extend beyond those allowed in the articles.309 Specifically, 
the ILC states that “further consequences” may be available to states 
attributed with a jus cogens violation, and that its articles should not be 
construed to “preclude the future development of a more elaborate regime 
of consequences entailed by such breaches.”310 
                                                     
301. CRAWFORD, supra note 244, art.1, at 61. 
302. Id. art. 2, at 61.  
303. Id. art. 8, at 61. 
304. Id. art. 13, at 63. 
305. Pestche, supra note 225, at 264. 
306. CRAWFORD, supra note 244, arts. 35–37, at 68. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. art. 40, at 69. 
309. Id. art. 41(3). 
310. Id. art. 41, cmt. ¶ 14, at 253. 
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Additionally, the articles on state responsibility allow a state to take 
countermeasures against another state that refuses to comply with its 
obligations to remedy an international wrongful act.311 Countermeasures 
are defined as “non-performance for the time being of international 
obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible 
State.”312 A state can only resort to countermeasures, though, if it first 
calls on a state to fulfill its obligations to cease the wrongful act, if 
ongoing, and provide the appropriate remedies, and first offer to negotiate 
with the wrongful state.313 Additionally, if the wrongful act has ceased and 
the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to 
make decisions binding on the parties, then countermeasures are 
improper.314 There are some actions states can never take as 
countermeasures, but denial of state immunity is not on that list.315 Lastly, 
countermeasures are proportional to the harm caused or the seriousness of 
the breach of international obligations.316 
The ILC’s articles on jurisdictional immunities and state responsibility 
provide some context as to how the international community may interpret 
a state’s choice to remedy a breach of jus cogens violations with the 
stripping of state immunity. The territorial-tort exception to state 
immunity shows that, regardless of whether or not the state is officially 
acting, or acting as a private party, it may be subject to liability for harm 
committed inside a foreign state.317 The articles on attribution show that a 
state may take countermeasures for serious breaches of international, 
peremptory norms, possibly including the withholding of its obligation to 
afford state immunity.318 While this may follow logically from looking at 
                                                     
311. Id. art. 49, at 71. 
312. Id. art. 49(2), at 71. The commentary to Article 49(2) further explains that the injured state 
effectively has the ability to withhold performance of an international obligation as long as it is not 
prohibited in Article 50. This suggests that a state, via a countermeasure, may choose to withhold its 
obligation to issue state immunity to foreign states in its domestic courts. 
313. Id. art. 52, at 72.  
314. Id. art. 52(3), at 72. Interestingly enough, neither the article itself, nor its commentary, states 
that a domestic court cannot be a “court” within the meaning of this article. It simply states that the 
court in which the dispute is pending must have jurisdiction over the dispute and the power to order 
provisional measures. Both of these features are possible in domestic courts if there is not state 
immunity. Id. art. 52 cmt. ¶ 8, at 299. This perhaps suggests that suit in a domestic court may not 
qualify as a “countermeasure” at all. Id. 
315. Id. art. 50, at 71–72. 
316. Id. art. 51, at 72. 
317. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Res/59/508 (Dec. 2, 2004) (opened for signature Jan. 17, 2005 and not 
yet entered into force). 
318. CRAWFORD, supra note 244. 
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the ILC’s articles, in practice, the ICJ has shown that it is not willing to 
find a jus cogens exception to state immunity.319 
C. State Immunity and Jus Cogens Violations in International 
Courts—Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and Other Relevant 
International Cases 
Because international courts preside nearly exclusively over 
international law disputes, there is no shortage of international court cases 
interpreting the collision of state immunity and jus cogens violations.320 
The most recent case from the ICJ regarding state immunity, 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,321 is most relevant to the 
intersection of jus cogens violations and state immunity because it directly 
addresses the issue. 
The parties in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State asked the ICJ to 
determine whether criminal acts by state officials constitute a waiver of 
state immunity.322 It was a dispute between Germany and Italy regarding 
jus cogens violations committed during the Third Reich, in which the 
plaintiff, an Italian national, was detained and forced to work in a factory 
until the end of the war by German soldiers.323 While the trial-court 
equivalent in Italy dismissed the case against Germany for want of 
jurisdiction in light of state immunity, the high court equivalent reversed 
the ruling and remanded to the trial court, holding that state immunity is 
not afforded when the actions of the state constitute international crime.324 
This ruling opened up the floodgates of litigation, as litigants filed twelve 
more actions against Germany in Italy.325 Additionally, several Greek 
nationals sought to enforce judgments against Germany in Italian courts 
following the Italy state immunity cases after having failed to enforce 
judgments in both Greek and German courts.326 Germany submitted the 
action for review to the International Court of Justice, asking for the court 
to find that Italian courts were in violation of international law by allowing 
                                                     
319. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 
2012 I.C.J. 99, 140 (Feb. 3). 
320. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19); Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).  
321. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 99. 
322. Id. at 140 
323. Id. at 113. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 114. 
326. Id. at 115–16. 
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suits against Germany to proceed because the suits claim that German 
actions violated international law.327 
The ICJ held in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State that jus cogens 
violations in Italy do not constitute an exception to Germany’s state 
immunity, but its reasoning leaves questions regarding the intersection of 
jus cogens norms and state immunity. The ICJ found that the actions of 
the German armed forces were clearly acta jure imperii, which are 
generally afforded state immunity.328 It then looked at the territorial-tort 
exception articulated in the ILC’s articles on jurisdictional immunities and 
found that it does not apply because, generally, the exception does not 
apply to situations of armed conflict.329 Considering the harmful acts 
occurred after Italy was defeated and declared war on Germany, its former 
ally, the territorial-tort exception was inapplicable.330 Then, the ICJ held 
that the gravity of the offenses alleged—kidnapping and forced 
servitude—do not constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity or 
deny Germany the ability to plead sovereign immunity.331 Additionally, 
even if the violations are jus cogens norms violations, from which “no 
derogation may be permitted,”332 jus cogens violations and state immunity 
cannot conflict because state immunity sits on the procedural plane and 
jus cogens violations sit on the substantive plane.333 Therefore, the ICJ 
found for Germany and ruled that Italy was in violation of international 
law as long as it allowed the lawsuits against Germany to proceed in its 
courts.334 
The ICJ’s discussion of the lack of collision between jus cogens 
violations and state immunity is interesting because it seems to ignore the 
process by which state immunity evolved from absolute to restrictive. 
When explaining the different planes on which the two concepts sit, the 
court concluded the rules of state immunity are procedural and simply 
limited to determining whether or not one state’s courts can exercise 
jurisdiction over another state.335 Whether the acts committed by the state 
are lawful or unlawful has no bearing on whether or not the state is 
                                                     
327. Id. at 117. 
328. Id. at 125. 
329. Id. at 130; see also INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD 
SESSION, supra note 36, at 46 (“[N]or does it apply to situations involving armed conflicts.”). 
330.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 130. 
331. Id. at 137. 
332. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 24, art. 36, at 344. 
333.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 140. 
334. Id. at 155. 
335. Id. at 137. 
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immune from jurisdiction in a foreign court.336 However, the court had 
just concluded earlier in the judgment that a large part of state immunity 
analysis comes from a determination of whether or not the acts allegedly 
committed by the state were sovereign or private (acta de jure imperii or 
gestionis).337 Additionally, the court seemed to disregard the steps 
different courts took when moving from absolute to restrictive immunity. 
Other courts would look to the actions in question to determine if they 
were the types of acts protected by state immunity.338 However, the ICJ 
held that the distinction between private and sovereign acts comes from 
the character of the acts rather than the substance of the acts.339 
Nevertheless, the ICJ concluded that Italy was in violation of international 
law as long as it allowed lawsuits against Germany to proceed without a 
viable path through the jurisdictional guard of state immunity.340 
IV. THE JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ACT 
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) was passed 
by Congress on September 9, 2016, by the House, after the Senate already 
passed the Act in May of that same year.341 Following President Obama’s 
veto of the bill on September 23, both houses of Congress passed it over 
the veto and enacted JASTA into law five days later.342 It was the only 
time a bill overrode Barack Obama’s veto throughout his eight years in 
office.343 
JASTA adds another exception to the FSIA in U.S. courts.344 The 
exception denies state immunity to the foreign state if the action pertains 
to an act of international terrorism in the United States or tortious acts 
committed by foreign states or their officials, regardless of where the acts 
occurred.345 
This Part explains the background behind the JASTA amendment to 
the FSIA, detailing the events leading up to its creation and enactment into 
                                                     
336. Id. 
337. Id. at 125 (“States are generally entitled to immunity in respect of acta jure imperii.”). 
338. See supra section I.B. 
339.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 125. 
340. Id. at 156. 
341. Actions Overview, supra note 14. 
342. Id. 
343. Russell Berman, The Runaway 9/11 Bill that Congress Refused to Stop, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/911-legislation-congress-obama-veto-
override/502337/ [https://perma.cc/U5KN-Q9AH]. 
344. JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605B, 2333 
(2016)). 
345. Id. § 3 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012)). 
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law. First, this Part will briefly discuss the terror attacks on September 11, 
2001. Second, this Part will highlight the litigation that resulted from the 
terror attacks and how the FSIA defeated lawsuits against Saudi Arabia 
and Saudi Arabian princes. Third, this Part will discuss the creation and 
enactment of JASTA, including important commentary from domestic 
politicians. Fourth, this Part will touch on reactions to the JASTA 
amendment across the globe, including those that believe this amendment 
puts the United States in violation of international law. 
A. The Terror Attacks of September 11, 2001 and Connections to 
Saudi Arabia 
On September 11, 2001, four planes travelling inside of the United 
States were hijacked and used as weapons against United States buildings 
and civilians.346 Two planes, both intending to travel from Boston to Los 
Angeles, crashed into the two World Trade Center towers in New York 
City.347 A third plane, intended to travel from Washington, D.C. to Los 
Angeles, crashed into the Pentagon.348 A fourth plane, intended to travel 
from Newark to San Francisco, crashed in a field in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, following the passengers’ attempt to retake the plane from 
the hijackers.349 Nearly 3,000 people died and more than 6,000 were 
injured.350 In addition, estimates for the property damage caused by the 
attacks range between ten and twenty billion dollars.351 
Troubling to many people was the overwhelming connection between 
the 9/11 hijackers and the country of Saudi Arabia. Nineteen members of 
terror group al-Qaeda carried out the attack.352 Of the nineteen hijackers, 
fifteen were of Saudi Arabian nationality.353 Additionally, an 
investigation into Saudi Arabia found that many extremist Islamic sects 
were exploiting the country’s dedication to charitable donations to fund 
their acts of violence against non-Islamic peoples.354 The Senate tasked 
                                                     
346. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 1–4. 
347. Id. at 32. 
348. Id. at 33. 
349. Id. 
350. Plumer, supra note 2. 
351. Carter & Cox, supra note 2. 
352. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 215–54. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 372. Charity is one of the five pillars of Islam, so as Saudi Arabia enriched itself through 
its natural resources, charitable donations vastly increased. Failure to regulate or track charitable 
spending led to the belief that Wahhabi extremists could be exploiting those donations for acts of 
terror. 
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the United States Senate Commission on 9/11 with authoring an 
investigative report on the details of the terrorist attacks and with 
suggesting responses to prevent an attack of this magnitude from 
happening again.355 The Commission concluded cooperation with Saudi 
Arabia was the appropriate route for the United States to pursue.356 The 
Commission noted that “political and economic reform” and a “shared 
interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect,” could “translate into a 
commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.”357 
B. Ensuing Litigation From the 9/11 Terror Attacks and Dismissal of 
Saudi Arabia and Princes From Suit 
As a result of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, victims and 
their families filed lawsuits against many different foreign defendants, 
alleging the defendants negligently, recklessly, or intentionally aided and 
abetted the hijackers on 9/11.358 In December of 2003, the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated six pending 9/11 lawsuits in the 
Southern District of New York.359 In response to the lawsuits, some 
defendants claimed that immunity under the FSIA prevented the court 
from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over the case.360 These 
defendants included several princes and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
itself.361 Plaintiffs claimed these defendants donated funds to charity, 
using both personal and state accounts, knowing that the charity would 
transfer the funds to al-Qaeda.362 
The district court dismissed the princes and the Kingdom from the 
lawsuit because of foreign sovereign immunity.363 First, it determined that 
                                                     
355. Id. at xv–xviii. 
356. Id. at 374. 
357. Id. 
358. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 (Terrorist Attacks II), 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 (Terrorist Attacks I), 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 
779–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). It is important to note that the defendants were dismissed as to actions in 
their official capacities, but the court also lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their 
individual capacities, so they were dismissed entirely. 
359. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2011, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003). 
360. Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 780–82. The foreign sovereign immunities act is the 
only way by which a court can assert jurisdiction over a foreign state or its instrumentalities. Id. at 
782; see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). 
361. Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
362. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d 71, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 
560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
363. Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (holding with respect to Prince Salman and Prince 
Naif); Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (holding with respect to Prince Turki and Prince 
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the Kingdom and four princes were either foreign states or agents of 
foreign states.364 Second, it found that several exceptions to the immunity 
provided by the FSIA did not apply to the princes or the Kingdom, 
including the commercial activities exception, the state-sponsored 
terrorism exception, and the torts exception.365 Because no exception 
under the FSIA applied to the princes or the Kingdom, the district court 
dismissed all claims against them.366 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the princes and the Kingdom from the consolidated suit for 
the same reasons.367 
The Second Circuit’s decision to affirm the district court shows that the 
United States’ torts exception does not necessarily extend to the limit that 
international law may allow. As mentioned earlier, Article 12 of the ILC’s 
articles on jurisdictional immunities allows for suits of any acts 
attributable to a state that injure or kill foreign nationals in foreign 
territories, paying no mind to whether the acts are de jure imperii or de 
jure gestionis.368 While the FSIA’s territorial-tort exception contains 
similar language, the legislative history contains information that puts its 
intended use into a narrower context: 
[A]lthough cast in general terms, the “tortious act” exception was 
designed primarily to remove immunity for cases arising from 
traffic accidents . . . . This is scarcely to say that the exception 
applies only to traffic accidents . . . rather, the point is that the 
legislative history counsels that the exception should be narrowly 
construed so as not to encompass the farthest reaches of common 
law.369 
This narrow interpretation of the FSIA’s territorial-tort exception by U.S. 
courts, when compared to the ILC’s broad territorial-tort exception in 
                                                     
Sultan). 
364. Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 553; Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 789. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has since ruled that the FSIA does not extend to state officials 
and that officials must seek foreign sovereign immunity under the common law rather than the FSIA, 
but that does not bear major importance to the analysis in this Comment. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 
308. 
365. Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 553–56; Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 792–
803. 
366. Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 575–76; Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 837–
38. 
367. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d at 71. 
368. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 44–46. 
369. MacArthur Area Citizens Ass’n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
14 - Kohan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:33 PM 
1556 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1515 
 
Article 12, shows the difference between the U.S.’s and the ILC’s 
treatment of state immunity. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit refused to apply the territorial-tort 
exception because it believed that the plaintiffs were attempting to avoid 
going through the terrorism exception to the FSIA. The FSIA’s terrorism 
exception applies to acts committed by states designated as state sponsors 
of terrorism by the executive branch that cause personal injury or death.370 
Given its similarity to the territorial-tort exception, the Second Circuit 
noted that it would be easy to allow the territorial-tort exception to 
swallow the terrorism exception, rendering the terrorism exception 
superfluous.371 Without further direction from Congress regarding 
immunity exceptions for state-sponsored terrorist acts, the courts were 
unwilling to apply the territorial-tort exception to terrorist acts.372 
Therefore, neither the state-sponsored terrorism exception nor the 
territorial-tort exception applied to the claims made by the plaintiffs in the 
9/11 litigation cases. 
C. JASTA’s Writing and Passing in Congress 
In response to the Second Circuit’s ruling in 2008, Senator Arlen 
Specter of Pennsylvania introduced the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act to the Senate in December of 2009.373 The bill specifically 
stated that the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Terrorist Attacks 
provided “undue protection from civil liability” to foreign groups that 
“provide material support or resources to foreign terrorist 
organizations.”374 The bill also stated that victims of international 
terrorism must have access to the courts to seek remedy from these groups 
that sponsor international terrorism for the injuries they or their loved ones 
suffered.375 Quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, the bill 
concluded, “suits against financiers of terrorism can cut the terrorists’ 
lifeline.”376 The bill never made it out of the Judiciary Committee in the 
Senate following extensive hearings in July 2010.377 The bill was then 
                                                     
370. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
371. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d at 90. 
372. Id. 
373. S. 2930, 111th Cong. (2009). 
374. Id. § 2(a)(7). 
375. Id. 
376. Id. § 2(a)(6) (quoting Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 691 (7th 
Cir. 2008)). 
377. Actions Overview: S. 2930—114th Congress (2009–2010), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/2930/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22% 
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reintroduced to the Senate in 2011378 and 2013.379 The Senate passed the 
bill in 2014, but the bill died in the House that same year without action 
from the House.380 
The version of JASTA that would eventually become law was 
introduced in the Senate in September 2015.381 Its purpose was to provide 
citizens with the “broadest possible basis” to seek civil liability against 
persons, groups, and foreign countries that directly or indirectly provide 
material support to terrorist activities against the United States.382 The 
pertinent text reads: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States in any case in which money damages 
are sought against a foreign state for physical injury to person or 
property or death occurring in the United States and caused by—
(1) an act of international terrorism in the United States; and (2) 
a tortious act or acts of the foreign state; or of any official, 
employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the 
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless 
where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.383 
Congress enacted the amendment allowing suits against foreign states 
accused of sponsoring acts of terror and committing torts abroad that 
cause damages within the United States—an amendment which explicitly 
allows a private cause of action.384 The amendment has retroactive effect 
on any lawsuits relating to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, but 
otherwise it has only prospective effect.385 However, recognizing that 
international relationships might be affected by the amendment, JASTA 
includes a provision that allows the Attorney General to intervene in civil 
proceedings to seek a stay, as long as the United States is engaging in 
discussions with the foreign state to resolve the civil claims.386 
                                                     
5C%22justice+against+sponsors+of+terrorism%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=7 [https://perma.cc/ 
TEC8-5HJL]. 
378. S. 1894, 112th Cong. (2011). 
379. S. 1535, 113th Cong. (2013). 
380. Actions Overview: S. 1535—113th Cong. (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1535/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s. 
+1535%22%5D%7D&r=3 [https://perma.cc/9UTR-K2D5]. 
381. Actions Overview, supra note 14. 
382. JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852 (2016). 
383. Id. § 3(a). 
384. Id. 
385. Id. § 7. 
386. Id. § 5(b)–(c). 
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D. Negative Domestic and International Reactions to the JASTA 
Amendment 
The JASTA amendment to the FSIA has received large amounts of 
criticisms, both domestic and abroad, regarding its practicality and 
legality. From a legal standpoint, many state leaders and international law 
scholars believe the United States will be in violation of international law 
whenever it allows suit against a foreign state under the amendment.387 
Following JASTA’s passage, Russia issued a statement saying the United 
States “once again demonstrated its complete disregard for international 
law” because “[a]ny American citizen can now sue any country and 
accuse it, without proof, of any possible wrongdoing” and then bypass the 
barrier of state immunity.388 A former French Justice Minister called the 
act a violation of international law and territorial sovereignty.389 The 
European Union released a statement prior to President Obama’s veto of 
JASTA, urging the President to act against it because the law “would be 
in conflict with fundamental principles of international law and in 
particular the principle of State sovereign immunity.”390 When President 
Obama vetoed JASTA, the White House issued a statement saying that 
JASTA “would upset longstanding international principles regarding 
sovereign immunity.”391 
The JASTA amendment also drew practical criticisms beyond the 
criticisms it received in the context of international law. In the statement 
vetoing JASTA, President Obama also expressed concerns with 
reciprocity, which is the international law concept that a state consents to 
an action if it takes that action against other states.392 Journalists and 
pundits have offered harsh criticisms of the law, calling it angering to 
                                                     
387. See, e.g., The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed’n, Comment by the Information 
and Press Department on the US Passing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act with 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, MID.RU (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2479122 [https://perma.cc/3U4Q-YMM8]. 
388. Id. 
389. Al-Rahman Youssef, supra note 19. 
390. European Union Delegation to the United States of America, EU on JASTA, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp-content/uploads/sites/47 
/2016/09/EU-on-JASTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9VL-4VPS]. 
391. Obama, supra note 15. 
392. Id. The practical effects of the JASTA amendment are beyond the scope of this Comment, 
but for further reading on reciprocity, see Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in 
International Law, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93 (2003).  
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Saudi Arabia,393 “irresponsible and dangerous,”394 and “the dumbest 
legislation ever.”395 Even Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated 
that the law could have “unintended ramifications” one day after 
overriding President Obama’s veto.396 
V. JASTA DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While JASTA is certainly controversial on both a domestic and 
international level, a study of state immunity shows that the exception 
provided by JASTA does not violate customary international law. First, 
as shown in the articles of the ILC on jurisdictional immunities and 
responsibilities, international law already allows for a JASTA-type 
amendment. Second, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State is not 
applicable to the jurisdiction imposed over foreign states by JASTA 
because that case involved the acts of official state soldiers in the Third 
Reich, and would not involve a potential defendant affected by JASTA 
unless there is an assertion that the terrorist acts were committed by 
foreign officials. Third, if Jurisdictional Immunities of the State is 
applicable, the ICJ’s conclusion was incorrect, as war crimes should not 
be considered protected as acta de jure imperii simply because the acts 
were committed by state agents. Additionally, as a practical matter, jus 
cogens violations should supersede state immunity in terms of 
international law, as shown through the development and creation of the 
restrictive doctrine of state immunity, and the ICJ in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State was wrong to separate the two concepts from each 
other. However, even if these arguments are inapplicable, the JASTA 
amendment can be interpreted in a way that does not violate customary 
international law. 
                                                     
393. Ben Hubbard, Angered by 9/11 Victims Law, Saudis Rethink U.S. Alliance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/middleeast/chagrined-by-9-11-victims-law-
saudis-rethink-us-alliance.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UM6E-47RN]. 
394. James Zogby, JASTA: Irresponsible and Dangerous, HUFFPOST (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/jasta-irresponsible-and-d_b_12269448.html 
[https://perma.cc/2KQ6-FUEV]. 
395. Rob Garver, The Dumbest Legislation Ever Passed by Congress Will Bite the US Back, 
CNBC (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/03/911-lawsuits-the-dumbest-legislation-ever-
passed-by-congress-will-bite-the-us-back.html [https://perma.cc/RK8R-KWPY]. 
396. Seung Min Kim & Burgess Everett, McConnell: Saudi 9/11 Law Could Have ‘Unintended 
Ramifications, POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/mitch-mcconnell-
saudi-9-11-bill-228903 [https://perma.cc/N2VB-E8MS]. 
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A. The ILC’s Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities and State 
Responsibility Already Allow a JASTA-Type Exception to State 
Sovereign Immunity 
The ILC’s articles on jurisdictional immunities and state responsibility 
allow for a JASTA-type exception to state immunity when combining the 
ILC’s broad territorial-tort exception and permission to use 
countermeasures in certain situations. Starting with the articles on 
jurisdictional immunities, the JASTA amendment falls under the 
territorial-tort exception in Article 12. According to the ILC, only three 
factors must be met to apply the territorial-tort exception.397 First, the act 
or omission causing the injuries to the third party must occur wholly or 
partially within the foreign state.398 Second, the actor must be present in 
the state at the time of the tortious act.399 Lastly, the act must be 
appropriately attributed to the state.400 If these three factors are met, then 
no state immunity is issued to the defendant-state, even if the acts are de 
jure imperii instead of de jure gestionis.401 
In a hypothetical JASTA case, such as the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001, these three conditions are likely met. First, the JASTA 
amendment only applies to acts of “international terrorism in the United 
States,” meaning that the act must occur in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.402 This satisfies the first condition of the territorial-tort 
exception. Second, in order for the tortious act to occur inside the United 
States, the actor must be present in the United States, here being the 
nineteen hijackers, meaning the second condition will likely be satisfied 
                                                     
397. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 44–45. 
398. See id. 
399. Id. 
400. Id. at 44. This is generally a requirement for any action taken against a state. 
401. Id. at 45. 
402. 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b)(1) (2012). This phrasing may seem odd when coupled with the 
definition of “international terrorism,” which, according to JASTA, has the same meaning the term is 
given in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). Part of the definition of international terrorism is that the acts “occur 
primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in 
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the person they appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) 
(2012) (emphasis added). It probably would have been clearer if Congress incorporated the definition 
of “domestic terrorism” instead of international terrorism, given the only difference is where the act 
occurs. See id. § 2331(5). However, this discrepancy likely lacks impact, as any acts of terrorism 
committed by foreign states inside U.S. territory is “international terrorism,” in that it is committed 
by international person, and adding “in the United States” after “international terrorism” in the JASTA 
amendment shows Congress’s intent of applying the exception only for acts committed inside U.S. 
borders. JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 3(a), 130 Stat. 852 (2016). 
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as well by the requirement that the act occur “in the United States.”403 
According to the ILC, this requirement simply prevents abrogation of 
state immunity in the odd situation in which a tortious act occurs near the 
border of two states and causes harm across state borders.404 Given this 
limitation in the text of JASTA, the JASTA cases will likely satisfy the 
ILC’s second element of the territorial-tort exception. 
This just leaves the third condition, which will also likely be met in the 
hypothetical JASTA case: attribution. As seen in the Articles on State 
Responsibility, attribution is two-fold. First, attribution refers to holding 
the state in question actually responsible for the actions, whether done by 
an official state actor or an agent under the control of the state actor.405 
Second, once an international wrongful act is attributed to the state, the 
question becomes what the appropriate remedy is for that wrongful act, 
whether remedies or countermeasures.406 
A JASTA case will likely satisfy these two factors of attribution in a 
way consistent with international law. When it comes to ensuring that the 
act in question is attributable to the state, this situation will be entirely 
fact-dependent. To analyze the issue, a court must consider the specific 
situation, including whether the wrongdoers committing the act of 
terrorism on United States land are official state actors or purported 
private actors.407 However, to use the September 11 terrorist attacks as an 
example, the actions of the nineteen terrorists may be attributed to a 
certain state if they were acting “under the direction and control of” the 
state in question.408 If the claims made by the plaintiffs were true, a strong 
argument could be made in favor of finding attribution. So while the first 
                                                     
403. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 45; see also JASTA § 3(a). It may be argued that this requirement precludes JASTA’s use in cases 
similar to the September 11 terrorist attack claims, in which the plaintiffs plead that the state actors 
sponsored the attack from abroad, meaning that the state’s act did not occur in the United States. 
However, this concern is covered by the third element of the territorial-tort exception: attribution. If 
attribution to the state is found, then the acts committed by the alleged non-state actors on United 
States land are attributable to the state, and the state is equally responsible as the individual actors. 
See INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, at 
45. 
404. INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, supra note 36, 
at 45. 
405. See CRAWFORD, supra note 244, arts. 1–27, at 61–66. 
406. Id. arts. 28–59, at 66–73. 
407. Therefore, the distinction between acta de jure imperii (official state acts only possible 
because of the actor’s connection to statehood) and act de jure gestionis (acts by state actors that are 
not in any way connected to its status as a state). See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. 
It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, at 126 (Feb. 3). 
408. CRAWFORD, supra note 244, art. 8, at 62. 
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element of attribution is entirely fact-dependent, it is likely to be met on 
most hypothetical JASTA cases, given the requirement of the act 
occurring on U.S. land and the ability to attribute private actors to states 
if the facts allow for it. 
The second aspect of attribution—providing the appropriate remedy—
is difficult to discuss in a hypothetical situation, but it would likely be met 
in a JASTA case as well. Using the September 11 attacks as an example, 
one can see how the features of remedy-seeking were met before the 
United States brought an official “international” countermeasure: suit in a 
domestic court. While many have accused the Saudi Arabian government 
and its officials of assisting the al Qaeda terrorists, the Kingdom has yet 
to admit responsibility for its actions.409 The lack of willingness to take 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts allows states to take 
appropriate countermeasures, which may include stripping the state of its 
state immunity in its domestic courts.410 Additionally, the ILC states that 
the rules change when the state commits a serious breach of international 
obligations, and any state involved in an act of “international terrorism in 
the United States” has certainly committed a serious breach of 
international norms.411 Therefore, the hypothetical JASTA case would 
allow U.S. courts to strip state immunity from foreign states within the 
confines and rules of international law as determined and restated by the 
ILC, meaning that the JASTA amendment is not in conflict with 
international law. 
B. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Is Inapplicable to the 
Exception to State Immunity Created by JASTA 
The ICJ’s decision in 2012 that jus cogens violations do not supersede 
grants of state immunity is inapplicable to the hypothetical JASTA case 
because of the factual differences between the two cases. Consider the 
facts of the Italian cases at issue in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: 
an Italian national, imprisoned by the Nazi soldiers of the Third Reich and 
subjected to forced labor, sues the state and officials of Germany, asking 
for reparations for their wrongdoings.412 These were acts committed by 
                                                     
409. Eric Lichtblau, Documents Back Saudi Link to Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html [https://perma.cc/J79A-V92L]. 
410. CRAWFORD, supra note 244, arts. 49, 52, at 70–71. 
411. Id. art. 41, at 69. 
412. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. 99, 110, 125 (Feb. 3) (holding that the acts in question are acta de jure imperii, meaning they 
were official sovereign acts). 
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German soldiers under the orders of a German leader following a 
declaration of war between the two countries after their alliance broke 
down due to the installation of a new leader.413 While the orders did 
happen to be war crimes, these orders were carried out by official German 
agents and were commanded by the official German leader.414 As horrible 
as the acts might be, they were acta de jure imperii as the term is meant 
to be used—official actions of a sovereign under the authority granted to 
it as a sovereign.415 
Juxtaposed with the case in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State is the 
hypothetical action brought under the exception to state immunity offered 
by JASTA. For example, in In re Terrorist Attacks the plaintiffs allege 
Saudi Arabia, as well as several princes, provided money to a charity 
organization, which was just a shell company used to fund terrorist 
activities.416 This is quite different from an actus de jure imperii of a state 
or state official ordering its soldiers to do something while at war with a 
nation; this is a state knowingly choosing to fund terrorist activities.417 
The alleged actions here are a far cry from the actions Germany 
committed during World War II. While the acts in both cases are equally 
horrible in nature, one was technically an official act taken by soldiers in 
a time of war against an enemy state, and the other was (allegedly) a group 
of extremists funded by Saudi Arabia to attack a nation with whom Saudi 
Arabia was not at war. Therefore, the two cases should be treated 
differently, and courts should not find Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State as dispositive on the question of JASTA’s legality. 
As a further point, while this Comment argues that the United States 
would not violate international law by allowing a JASTA case to proceed 
to the merits, U.S. courts are not bound by ICJ decisions.418 Regardless of 
whether or not courts see JASTA as inconsistent with international law, 
U.S. courts will enforce the exception, likely without even considering the 
                                                     
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. Id. at 126. 
416. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d 71, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 
560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
417. Id. 
418. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding that the ICJ’s decision finding 
the United States in violation of international law for treatment of a Mexican national it wished to 
prosecute is not automatically enforceable in domestic law). However, courts are bound by 
international law concepts adopted by the Supreme Court. This point is simply to note that the 
Supreme Court has been willing to ignore directives from international courts before, so it would not 
be surprising to see the Court do the same with JASTA. 
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international implications.419 Normally, U.S. courts operate under the 
assumption that a U.S. law will not violate international law unless 
Congress makes a clear indication that it intends to violate or deviate from 
international law.420 Therefore, even if this exception does violate 
international law, it will likely have no effect on the way it is treated in 
U.S. courts. 
Because Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’s facts differ from the 
facts of a hypothetical JASTA case, the United States is not violating 
international law when it bypasses state immunity upon a showing that 
the foreign state or official intentionally sponsored terrorism affecting 
U.S. nationals. 
C. Even if Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Is Applicable, the 
JASTA Exception to State Immunity Should Not Violate 
International Law Because Intentional Decisions to Commit War 
Crimes Should Not Be Classified as Acta de Jure Imperii 
International law does not support a finding of state immunity based on 
the history of state immunity. Over time, the doctrine of state immunity 
has grown from absolute immunity to restrictive immunity—a doctrine 
that recognizes the differences between private and sovereign acts.421 
While this distinction is not always clear, it remains apparent that 
sovereign immunity is only granted to a state or an official when that state 
or official is actually acting as a sovereign.422 One can strongly and 
persuasively argue that a state does not act as a sovereign when it assists 
or sponsors intentional acts of terrorism,423 so offering state immunity to 
officials allegedly intentionally sponsoring terrorism goes against, or 
should go against, principles of international law. 
Consider the absolute doctrine of state immunity. If William 
Blackstone were asked if a state official could receive immunity for an act 
that intentionally sponsors terrorism, Blackstone would say that a state 
official could do no such act, given the official’s status as the supreme law 
                                                     
419. Id. 
420. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
421. See supra Part I. 
422. See supra Part I. 
423. Cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), 2012 I.C.J. 99, at 
125 (defining acta de jure imperii as acts which fall within “the exercise of sovereign power”). The 
distinction between what are and are not acta de jure imperii seems to fall under whether or not a 
sovereign would be able to act this way absent its status as a sovereign. This distinction arose in the 
transition era from absolute to restrictive immunity. See supra section I.B. 
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of the land, and afford that state official, or the state itself, immunity.424 
According to Blackstone, it would be impossible for a state official to 
commit such an act.425 For this reason, it would be impossible to name the 
state, the king, or an official in certain suits because they could literally 
do no wrong. 
However, as noted in The Schooner Exchange, state immunity was 
never truly absolute.426 Chief Justice Marshall placed special emphasis on 
the fact that France and the United States were allies, and not at war.427 
This and similar language implies that, even in the days of absolute 
immunity, there could be a denial of state immunity if the state did 
something that could amount to an act of war when two states were not at 
war, especially if that action was one of extreme atrocity.428 A litigant, 
then, would have to argue that state-sponsored acts of terrorism would 
amount to acts of war. 
Since the days of absolute sovereign immunity, however, courts have 
recognized the difference between when a state is acting as a sovereign 
and when a state is acting as a private citizen.429 This distinction arises 
when the state or state official does something that does not match with 
its sovereign status.430 It is best understood with the action that led to the 
restrictive doctrine: commercial transactions.431 Situations would arise in 
which there was a disagreement with a sales contract, or some goods 
might not make it from the seller to the buyer, and a dispute would 
occur.432 Courts and lawmakers saw how state immunity frustrated the 
practicalities of the growing global trading environment: if states and their 
officials received protections just because they were states, people were 
not going to trade with them.433 Simply put, it would be unfair to grant 
these states immunity in these situations where the state clearly is not 
acting in its official capacity, beyond its actual status as a sovereign state. 
The same reasoning can be applied to the JASTA amendment. Litigants 
can argue that state-sponsored acts of terrorisms are war crimes. Such acts 
                                                     
424. BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at 239. 
425. Id. 
426. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 141–42 (1812). 
427. Id. 
428. See id. 
429. See supra Part I. 
430. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). 
431. See generally SUCHARITKUL, supra note 117, at 23–152 (detailing the application of 
sovereign immunity to trading activities). 
432. Id. 
433. Id. 
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are far removed from a situation in which soldiers, acting under the orders 
of a commander-in-chief, defend their nation against invaders or take 
other official acts during an official, ongoing war.434 This is a situation in 
which the state or state official purposely gives vigilantes the means to 
conduct acts of terrorism on foreign soil.435 By affording states and their 
officials immunity in these situations, courts and states are giving the 
benefits of sovereign status to a sovereign that does not act as a sovereign. 
These arguments demonstrate that the intentional sponsoring of 
terrorism by a state should not be seen as actus de jure imperii but as acta 
de jure gestionis. Furthermore, because acta de jure gestionis are not 
afforded state immunity, intentional acts sponsoring terrorism should not 
be afforded state immunity in courts, and such a denial of immunity 
should not be seen as a violation of international law. 
D. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Was Wrong to Place State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens in Two Different Planes Given the 
Substantive Questions Surrounding Whether or Not State Immunity 
Is Given 
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ was incorrect in 
determining that state immunity and jus cogens violations exist on two 
separate planes because the granting or denying of state immunity is often 
dependent on the types of acts in which the state is engaged.436 This, too, 
reflects back to the growth and development of the restrictive doctrine of 
state immunity in that states began to focus on the actions of states in 
determining whether or not state immunity was appropriate.437 The ICJ 
failed to recognize or consider the growth of state immunity, which 
created its exceptions through the conduct of the states themselves. 
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ found that jus cogens 
violations, even those that are admitted or obvious, do not supersede state 
immunity because the two concepts sit at two separate planes of the law.438 
State immunity, it ruled, is a procedural doctrine, and exists separate from 
the merits of the case.439 It went on to describe jus cogens as substantive 
portions of a case, meaning they do not affect and do not change the 
                                                     
434. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99, at 113–14 (Feb. 3). 
435. See, e.g., Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
436. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 140. 
437. See supra Part I. 
438. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 140. 
439. Id. 
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procedural questions posed in a given case.440 So while derogation from 
jus cogens norms is impermissible, the ICJ found that, even if there are 
clear derogations from jus cogens, it cannot affect whether or not a state 
has jurisdiction over another state.441 Therefore, it concluded that jus 
cogens violations do not affect whether or not sovereign immunity is 
granted in a given case. 
The distinction between sovereign and private acts in granting state 
immunity is particularly important to explaining why international law 
supports a “jus cogens exception” to state immunity. The international law 
trend moved from the absolute to the restrictive theory of state immunity 
by looking at the act in question and determining whether or not the state 
was acting in its sovereign capacity (acta de jure imperii) or more as a 
private actor (acta de jure gestionis).442 Despite that history, the ICJ in 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State held that state immunity sits on the 
“procedural” plane of the law, separate and distinct from the substantive 
acts of the state, regardless of whether or not those acts constitute jus 
cogens violations.443 It would be impossible to make this determination 
without first looking at the type of conduct in which the state is engaged. 
The exceptions to state immunity all reflect an interest in denying state 
immunity when the state does not act as a sovereign, but instead as a 
private party. It purposely distinguishes between acta de jure imperii and 
acta de jure gestionis because a state should only be immune when it is 
acting as a state, not when it is acting as a private entity.444 The only way 
in which a court can determine whether or not a state is acting as a state 
or as a private entity is by looking at the actions that occurred. For 
example, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ determined that 
the acts in question were sovereign acts because they were orders from a 
nation’s leader to a nation’s army and were directed at a nation with whom 
war was ongoing.445 Without looking at the specific substantive actions 
involved in the case, it is impossible to determine whether or not a state is 
actually acting as a state, meaning it is impossible to decide whether or 
not state immunity is appropriate. 
State immunity and alleged jus cogens violations, then, should not exist 
as separate international conflicts with no relation to one another, given 
the connection state immunity has to the merits of a given case. Without 
                                                     
440. Id. 
441. Id. 
442. See supra Part I. 
443. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 140. 
444. For example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act differentiates implicitly between private 
and sovereign acts through the codified exceptions in § 1605. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). 
445.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 99. 
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examining the allegations and the substantive parts of a claim against a 
state, it would be impossible to determine whether that state was actually 
acting as a state or as a private party. Customary international law supports 
a denial of state immunity when a state violates jus cogens. 
E. The JASTA Amendment May Be Narrowly Construed so that It 
Does Not Violate International Law 
Despite emphatically arguing that the JASTA exception is within the 
limits of state immunity accepted by international law, if it is not, the 
exception may be narrowly tailored so that it does not violate existing 
precedent, including Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. In fact, it is 
highly likely that U.S. courts will choose to do this, given the Supreme 
Court’s assumption that Congress does not intend to violate international 
law unless it explicitly states an intention to do so.446 
Given the fact that there is no such exception to state immunity for jus 
cogens violations in international law, a United States court can hold that 
the JASTA amendment purely applies to private acts, or acta de jure 
gestionis, and not sovereign acts, or acta de jure imperii. This means that 
the JASTA amendment would not apply to any harms committed by 
foreign sovereigns in a proper exercise of sovereign power, harmonizing 
with the holding in Jurisdictional Immunity of the State. 
This construction would also coincide with the ICJ’s interpretation of 
jus cogens violations and state immunity in Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State. In that case, the ICJ ruled that jus cogens violations cannot 
waive state immunity implicitly, and therefore cannot turn acta de jure 
imperii into acta de jure gestionis.447 Traditionally, the word “terrorism” 
has not been used to describe actions by soldiers, under the orders of a 
government official, against another state during a time of war.448 
Terrorism, instead, usually refers to acts of rogue vigilantes intended on 
making a radical or violent political statement through intimidation and 
fear.449 Taken in this light, the JASTA amendment does not turn sovereign 
acts into private acts simply through substantive violations from the 
derogation of a jus cogens norm; instead, it recognizes that intentional 
sponsorship of terrorism is a private act in its own right. Therefore, US 
courts may interpret the JASTA amendment in a way that coincides with 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and the rest of international law. 
                                                     
446. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
447.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 125. 
448. See 28 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012). 
449. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thanks to the JASTA amendment to the FSIA, victims of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and their families can see their day in court in an attempt 
to hold someone responsible for the devastation resulting from that day.450 
While many people have argued that the JASTA exception puts the United 
States in violation of international law, this Comment shows that the 
United States would not, or at least should not, be in conflict with 
international custom. Given the novelty of the law, it is uncertain how 
United States courts will interpret its effect until the law makes its way up 
to a circuit court or the Supreme Court. However, given the development 
of state immunity, the treatment of jus cogens norms in international law, 
the ILC’s restatement of international law on immunity and responsibility, 
and the distinctions between a hypothetical JASTA case and 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, United States courts should find 
the JASTA exception not in violation of international law. 
 
                                                     
450. See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–
1605B, 2333 (2016)). 
